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INTRODUCTION 
It is now commonplace for judicial politics scholars to describe the 
federal judicial hierarchy in terms of a principal–agent relationship.1  The 




  Charles Nagel Professor, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis.  My thanks to Jarrod 
Reece and William Osberghaus who provided excellent research assistance.  For helpful comments and 
feedback, thanks to Scott Baker, Matthew Hall, and David Law, as well as participants at the Political 
Science and Law Conference hosted by Northwestern University School of Law and the Searle Center 
on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law and participants 
at workshops at Washington University School of Law and St. Louis University School of Law. 
1  See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court 
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534, 536 (2002); Charles M. Cameron, 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model 
of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 103 (2000); Tom S. Clark, A 
Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 76 (2008); Tracey E. George & 
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175 (2001); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A 
Principal-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 820–22 (2003); Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. 
Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical 
Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 162–64 (2003); Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doc-
trine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 329 (2007); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan B. 
Haire & Donald R. Songer, Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An Organizational 
Perspective, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 607, 610 (2007); Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipa-
tion and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 669, 671–75 (2008); Donald 
R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent 
Model of Supreme Court–Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994); Matt Spitzer & 
Eric Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 670 (2000).   
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conceptualized as the “principal” and the lower federal courts as the 
“agents.”  Given resource constraints, the Supreme Court necessarily dele-
gates some of the work of deciding cases to other courts, but as the princip-
al, it sets the policy that the lower courts should implement.2  Lower court 
judges, however, have their own goals and preferences, which raises the 
risk that they will pursue their own ends,3 thus creating the classic dilemma 
of principal–agent relationships: how to ensure that agents act on the prin-
cipal’s behalf and not in their own self-interest. 
Like traditional attitudinal models, which hold that judges’ preferences 
determine their voting behavior, principal–agent models assume that judges 
have policy goals that they seek to effectuate through their decisionmaking.4  
Most commonly, these policy goals are framed in terms of outcomes.  For 
example, conservative judges are assumed to prefer outcomes favoring the 
government in criminal cases, and liberal judges are assumed to prefer out-
comes favoring civil rights plaintiffs.  Although principal–agent theories 
recognize that institutional context affects judges’ decisionmaking, many of 
these theories simply ignore the role of law.  To the extent that they do ac-
count for law, they tend to understand it in instrumental terms—as a means 
of mediating the inevitable conflict between upper and lower courts over 
policy outcomes.  Assuming that policy outcomes are the goal of judges’ 




2  See, e.g., George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822 (explaining that the Supreme Court delegates a 
great deal of its work to lower courts, which must effectuate the Court’s doctrines); Randazzo, supra 
note 1, at 671 (discussing how the principal, lacking resources, delegates tasks to the agent, who is ex-
pected to represent the principal’s interests); Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675 (describing 
the Supreme Court as the principal and the courts of appeals as agents who should follow the Court’s 
policy dictates).   
3  See, e.g., Benesh & Reddick, supra note 1, at 536 (positing that lower courts will not follow Su-
preme Court policy when they disagree with it); Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 104 (assum-
ing that upper and lower courts have different preferences regarding case dispositions); George & Yoon, 
supra note 1, at 822 (noting that when the preferences of Supreme Court and lower court judges diverge, 
there is “an incentive to make a non-complying ruling”); Lindquist, Haire & Songer, supra note 1, at 
610 (describing how goal conflicts that arise when upper and lower courts have divergent preferences 
reduce the ability of the Supreme Court to guide the decisions of the lower courts); McNollgast, Politics 
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 
1633–36 (1995) (pointing out that the Supreme Court and lower courts often differ significantly in their 
preferences regarding judicial doctrine, creating a risk of noncompliance with Supreme Court 
precedent); Randazzo, supra note 1, at 671 (noting that the agent’s preferences may differ from the prin-
cipal’s, creating tension in the relationship); Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675 (observing 
that “utility maximizing appeals court judges also have their own policy preferences, which they may 
seek to follow to the extent possible”). 
4  See, e.g., George & Solimine, supra note 1, at 175 (theorizing that Justices seek to advance their 
policy preferences through the certiorari process); Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 163 (sug-
gesting that “federal judges at all levels are guided by their policy preferences”); McNollgast, supra note 
3, at 1636 (assuming that judges “act rationally to bring policy as close as possible to their own pre-
ferred outcome”); Spitzer & Talley, supra note 1, at 655 (modeling judges as primarily interested in 
reaching legal outcomes which are as consistent as possible with their policy preferences).  
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for upper courts to communicate their policy preferences5 or as an instru-
ment for exercising control over lower courts.6 
The assumption that the lower federal courts are agents of the Supreme 
Court has become so widely accepted that the applicability of the model to 
the federal judicial hierarchy is rarely questioned.  A few have raised 
doubts—for example, Judge Richard Posner notes that if federal appellate 
judges are agents, the identity of their principals is “a matter of some uncer-
tainty.”7  Similarly, others have suggested that federal judges could appro-
priately be viewed as the agents of their appointing President, Congress, or 
the public.8  Nevertheless, many judicial politics scholars readily accept the 
characterization of the lower federal courts as agents of the Supreme Court.  
Because the federal judiciary is organized as a hierarchy, with some resem-
blance to other organizational forms that utilize monitoring and incentives 
to achieve the principal’s goals, the principal–agent model is assumed to be 
an apt one.   
Upon closer examination, however, the principal–agent model does not 
map so neatly onto the structure of the judicial hierarchy.  For example, the 
Supreme Court, to a far greater degree than most principals, is highly con-
strained in its ability to shape the incentives of district and circuit court 
judges.  Moreover, there is no direct contractual relationship between Su-
preme Court Justices and lower federal court judges, making uncertain the 
basis for any duty on the part of lower courts to act in the interests of the 




5  See, e.g., Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and Intrajudi-
cial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 757 (2002) (suggesting that policy-oriented appellate 
courts develop lines of cases in order to communicate better with lower courts); Haire, Lindquist & 
Songer, supra note 1, at 143–44 (asserting that appellate courts’ power to affirm or reverse is a means of 
signaling their preferences to the lower courts); see also, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1639 (de-
scribing a “doctrinal interval” that indicates a range of rules “that are acceptable to the Supreme Court 
when reviewing decisions by a lower court”).  
6  See George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 823–24; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 326. 
7  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 12, 126 (2008). 
8  See, e.g., CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 33–34 (2007) (liken-
ing the relationship between a president and his Supreme Court nominee to that of a principal and an 
agent); POSNER, supra note 7, at 126 (asking whether a federal judge’s principal is a higher court, Con-
gress, the appointing President, the current President, the American people, the framers of the Constitu-
tion, the Constitution itself and statutes and precedents, or “the law”); James C. Brent, An Agent and 
Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 255 (1999) (finding 
that, in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, “Congress [was] as successful as the Supreme 
Court in enlisting the Court of Appeals as its agent”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges 
Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2005) (describing 
judges as agents of the public); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 435 
(2007) (observing that lower court judges could be conceptualized as agents of the President who ap-
pointed them or of the Congress that confirmed them and enacted the laws that they interpret); Spitzer & 
Talley, supra note 1, at 650 (noting that the Judicial Branch could be viewed as delegated decisionmaker 
for the Legislative and Executive Branches). 
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the concept of agency was developed by the common law to regulate repre-
sentative relationships and later applied by economists and political scien-
tists to describe institutions such as the private firm or the government 
agency—all contexts quite different from the judicial hierarchy.  The lack 
of an exact fit alone does not mean the model cannot be useful, as existing 
theoretical constructs may offer useful insights when applied in new con-
texts.  Models necessarily simplify a complex reality, however, and in 
doing so, they highlight certain features of the phenomenon under study 
while eliding others.  
The purpose of this Article is to critically examine the use of principal–
agent models to describe the federal judicial hierarchy.  It explores how re-
liance on principal–agent theories shapes our understanding of how federal 
judges make decisions and interact with other actors in the judicial system.  
As I argue below, agency models are useful in highlighting certain aspects 
of the interaction between upper and lower courts—specifically, the exis-
tence of value conflicts and informational asymmetries.  In other ways, 
however, traditional principal–agent models are a poor fit for the relation-
ship between the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court.  As a conse-
quence, reliance on these models may limit our understanding of intercourt 
interactions.  More specifically, these models tend to obscure important 
normative questions about the relationship between lower and upper courts, 
as well as to distort the role that law plays in judicial decisionmaking.   
Moving beyond principal–agent theories expands the possibilities for 
modeling and understanding the federal judicial hierarchy.  Instead of being 
viewed as merely a signal or command to lower courts, the law should be 
understood as the joint product of the Supreme Court and the lower courts.  
Producing a coherent body of law requires cooperation and coordination be-
tween the various levels of the judicial hierarchy at the same time that the 
law is the ground on which value conflicts between judges are played out.  
Thus, the interaction between the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
might be more productively modeled as a type of mixed-motive coordina-
tion game rather than a traditional principal–agent relationship. 
I.  THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY 
The basic outline of the federal judicial system is familiar.  Federal 
courts are arranged hierarchically, with district courts hearing and disposing 
of cases in the first instance, subject to review by one of the twelve circuit 
courts of appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court.  While district 
judges generally hear and decide cases alone, the appellate courts are col-
legial courts.  Courts of appeals typically hear cases in panels of three 
judges, and the nine Justices of the Supreme Court decide cases together.  
Although the interactions among judges on a collegial court are a critical 
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aspect of the decisionmaking process,9 for purposes of this Article, I treat 
these appellate panels as unitary actors vis à vis the other courts in the hie-
rarchy. 
In light of this hierarchical structure, judicial politics scholars have 
used principal–agent theories to describe the interaction between the Su-
preme Court and the lower federal courts.10  Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal, 
and Charles Cameron describe the Supreme Court in terms of a “principal, 
whose subordinates, the courts of appeals, are the agents” and conclude that 
“the circumstances [of the judicial hierarchy] fit the model well.”11  Similar-
ly, Tracey George and Albert Yoon write that “[s]ince the Supreme Court is 
formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s decisions can be 
conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its agents, 
the lower courts.”12  Others argue that the “institutional dynamics associated 
with appellate review in the federal judicial hierarchy are captured by prin-




9  A number of empirical studies have demonstrated that federal appellate court judges’ voting pat-
terns appear to be influenced not only by the judges’ own policy preferences but also by the other judges 
with whom they sit when deciding a case.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. 
ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 11–12 (2006) (finding that “variations in panel composition lead to dramatically different 
outcomes” in a number of issue areas); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (finding evidence of panel effects in cases under section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998) (conclud-
ing that the presence of ideological minorities on judicial panels influences the votes of majority 
judges); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empiri-
cal Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1374 (2009) (empirically confirming that 
panel composition affects decisionmaking on circuit courts of appeals and testing competing explana-
tions for panel effects); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1771–72 (1997) (concluding that the ideology of the other panel members influ-
ences a judge’s vote in environmental cases); Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting 
Patterns: A ‘Social Interactions’ Framework 20 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 
2010-27, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1636002 (finding evidence of panel effects 
in multiple datasets of circuit judge votes in a variety of issue areas).  In addition, a rich academic litera-
ture has considered how interactions among judges on multimember courts, such as the United States 
Supreme Court or the federal courts of appeals, affect their decisionmaking.  E.g., FORREST MALTZMAN, 
JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL 
GAME (2000); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: 
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1993); Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and Com-
pliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 
61 (2003); Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Su-
preme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2007). 
10  See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
11  Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675. 
12  George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 819. 
13  Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 146. 
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examining the impact of Supreme Court decisions on lower court beha-
vior.”14 
Scholars invoked principal–agent theories in order to better understand 
the relationship between upper and lower courts and to explore how the hie-
rarchical structure of the judiciary influences decisionmaking.  In many 
ways, these inquiries represent a real advance.  Traditional attitudinal mod-
els of judicial decisionmaking emphasized the centrality of judicial atti-
tudes, generally understood as policy preferences, in determining judicial 
voting behavior.15  This approach focused on the individual judge and often 
assumed that case outcomes reflect the sincere policy preferences of the 
judge or judges voting in the case.  Principal–agent theories draw attention 
to the fact that judges do not decide in isolation but are part of a larger insti-
tutional structure and that their interactions with other actors in that system 
also influence their decisionmaking.  Thus, principal–agent theories have 
led scholars to explore questions such as the extent to which circuit courts 
obey the dictates of the Supreme Court,16 how the Supreme Court selects 
which cases to review,17 and how the Supreme Court uses doctrine to con-
trol outcomes in the lower courts.18  Principal–agent theories are certainly 
useful in framing these types of inquiries.  However, the use of any heuris-
tic necessarily draws attention to certain features of a situation while ignor-
ing others.  In the Parts that follow, I explore the ways in which the 
assumptions of agency theory have shaped and limited our understanding of 
the judicial hierarchy. 
As a caveat, my focus here is on the vertical relationships within the 
federal judiciary, specifically between the United States Supreme Court and 
the lower federal courts.  Principal–agent theories have been applied to oth-
er interactions in the judicial system as well: for example, the relationships 




14  Randazzo, supra note 1, at 672. 
15  See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL 65 (1993) (explaining that the attitudinal model “holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes 
in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices”); Frank B. 
Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 
92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (1997) (“[The attitudinal model] suggests that judicial decisionmaking is 
not based upon reasoned judgment from precedent, but rather upon each judge’s political ideology and 
the identity of the parties.”).  
16  See Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1. 
17  See Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1. 
18  See Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1. 
19  See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, State Supreme Court Decision Making in Con-
fession Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109, 125 (2002); Keith Rollin Eakins & Karen Swenson, An Analysis of 
the States’ Responses to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 371, 373–74 (2007); 
Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1476 (2005).  But cf. John 
C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Policy Convergence in a Federal Judicial System: The Application 
of Intensified Scrutiny Doctrines by State Supreme Courts, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 122, 124–25 (1997) 
(questioning the application of a principal–agent model to relationships between the United States Su-
preme Court and the state supreme courts). 
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tween a circuit sitting en banc and a three-judge panel,20 and between the 
federal courts of appeals and district courts.21  These theories may or may 
not be apt when applied to those settings, and I do not attempt to address 
them here.  The more general point is that a close examination of the partic-
ular circumstances is important in determining when it is useful to draw an 
analogy to the agency relationship in any context. 
II. PRINCIPAL–AGENT RELATIONSHIPS 
By applying principal–agent theories to the federal judicial hierarchy, 
scholars draw on an extensive literature about a particular type of relation-
ship.  In this Part, I review three classic conceptions of the agency relation-
ship—from common law, economics, and political science.  These 
conceptions differ in important ways from one another and are deployed for 
different purposes, yet all share certain core elements that give the theory its 
power.  The scholars who characterize the judicial hierarchy in principal–
agent terms are not arguing that it matches these earlier conceptions in all 
their particulars.  Nevertheless, examining the canonical cases, their basic 
structure, and the insights they generate helps illuminate the ways in which 
principal–agent theories may enhance or impede understanding of the fed-
eral judicial hierarchy.   
A. Common Law Agency 
Concepts of agency are rooted in the common law and intended to ad-
dress situations in which one person can be legally bound by the actions of 
another.22  Although the law recognizes a number of situations in which one 
person can act on behalf of another, an agency relationship is a particular 
type of representative relationship with defined legal consequences.  Ac-
cording to the Third Restatement of Agency, 
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) 
manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent mani-




20  See Clark, supra note 1, at 76; Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Deci-
sion to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 245 (1999); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald 
Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1011–13 (1991); Michael E. Soli-
mine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 49 (1988). 
21  See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Af-
firmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 373 (2005); Haire, 
Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 144–50; Randazzo, supra note 1, at 673–75.  
22  See Mark McGaw, Agency: English Common Law, in 1 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 108, 108–10 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009). 
23  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 542 
Several elements are necessary to establish a legally recognized agency 
relationship.  First, the relationship is based on contract or consent.24  Mu-
tual agreement is necessary not only to establish the existence of the rela-
tionship but also to determine the scope of the agency—that is, the areas in 
which the agent is empowered to act on behalf of the principal.25  The 
second element is the power of the agent.26  The agency relationship creates 
authority in the agent to act for the principal—not only to pursue the prin-
cipal’s interests but to do so in ways that may bind the principal or affect its 
legal relations with third parties.27  Third, the principal retains the right to 
control the actions of the agent.  This right of control entails the right “to 
assess the agent’s performance, provide instructions to the agent, and ter-
minate the agency relationship by revoking the agent’s authority.”28  Con-
sent and control are essential elements.  In the absence of consent, express 
or implied, or a right of control and termination, the common law generally 
does not recognize an agency relationship.29  
Much of traditional agency law is concerned with legal relationships 
with third parties, focusing on questions such as when and under what cir-
cumstances the actions of an agent will create binding obligations or give 
rise to liability on the part of the principal.30  More importantly for the dis-
cussion here, agency law also addresses the obligations of the agent to the 
principal.  Specifically, the law imposes on the agent a fiduciary duty to act 
not only on behalf of the principal but also in the interest of the principal.31  
This duty requires the agent not merely to follow instructions but also to act 
loyally, subordinating her own interests to that of the principal.  As ex-
plained in the Restatement, 
An agent’s fiduciary position requires the agent to interpret the principal’s 
statement of authority, as well as any interim instructions received from the 




24  See id. cmt. d (“Under the common-law definition, agency is a consensual relationship.  The defi-
nition requires that an agent-to-be and a principal-to-be consent to their association with each other.”); 
Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1969, 
1981 (1987) (describing a consent theory of agency); Gerard McMeel, Philosophical Foundations of the 
Law of Agency, 116 L.Q. REV. 387, 388–92 (2000) (providing a history and description of the consen-
sual theory of agency doctrine). 
25  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e. 
26  See id. cmt. c. 
27  See id. 
28  Id. cmt. f(1). 
29  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. (“In general, agency does not encompass situations 
in which an ‘agent’ is not subject to a right of control in the person who benefits from or whose interests 
are affected by the agent’s acts, who lacks the power to terminate the ‘agent’s’ representation, or who 
has not consented to the representation.”).  
30  See id. §§ 6.01–6.11, 7.03–7.08; see also Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, 
6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369, 370 (2004) (explaining that traditional agency law is often concerned with 
what happens when the agent’s effort is mischanneled, causing harm to a third party). 
31  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e. 
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agent knows or should know, in light of facts that the agent knows or should 
know at the time of acting.32   
Although in theory the agent is under the control of the principal, as a 
practical matter that control will always be incomplete.  It is impossible for 
the principal to give advance instructions precise enough to avoid giving the 
agent some discretion.  That inability to specify comprehensive directions 
and the agent’s authority to act in the absence of the principal mean that the 
agent will inevitably have opportunities for personal gain as a result of the 
agency.  The law responds to this risk by imposing a duty of loyalty.  Thus, 
“[a]n agent . . . is not free to exploit gaps or arguable ambiguities in the 
principal’s instructions to further the agent’s self-interest, or the interest of 
another, when the agent’s interpretation does not serve the principal’s pur-
poses or interests known to the agent.”33 
The agent’s duty of loyalty has been explained in different ways.  
Some courts and commentators emphasize a moral basis for the duty, citing 
the vulnerability of the principal as the reason for imposing a higher stan-
dard of conduct on the agent.34  This vulnerability is inherent in the relation-
ship because the agent has the power to affect the principal’s legal rights 
and obligations; in many cases, this vulnerability is exacerbated by the 
agent’s superior knowledge, skill, and access to information.  On this view, 
the agent’s fiduciary duties are imposed by law based on the character of 
the relationship.   
Others have explained fiduciary duties as a means of simplifying the 
contracting process.35  As Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel 
write, “[T]he duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility of writing 
contracts completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”36  Principals typi-
cally hire an agent because they cannot perform the work—perhaps due to 
limited time or lack of expertise—but the conditions making the agency de-




32  Id.  
33  Id.  
34  See Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de France v. New England Reinsurance Corp., 944 F. Supp. 
986, 996 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that “fiduciary dut[ies] arise out of a relationship of vulnerability”); 
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 776–
77 (2000) (arguing that the rationale for the duty of loyalty is a gross imbalance of power between the 
parties); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
879, 902 (suggesting that fiduciary obligations are often justified because of one party’s vulnerability to 
the fiduciary’s abuse of power). 
35  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (“In the absence of the fiduciary bench-
mark, the principal would have a greater need to define authority and give interim instructions in more 
elaborate and specific form to anticipate and eliminate contingencies that an agent might otherwise ex-
ploit in a self-interested fashion.”); id. § 8.01 cmt. b (“The fiduciary principle supplements manifesta-
tions that a principal makes to an agent, making it unnecessary for the principal to graft explicit 
qualifications and prohibitions onto the principal’s statements of authorization to the agent.”). 
36  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 
426 (1993). 
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agent’s efforts.  In such a situation, rather than attempting to provide de-
tailed directions, the principal delegates authority to the agent to achieve an 
objective, subject to the duty of loyalty.  The duty thus “replaces detailed 
contractual terms,” and the obligations it imposes should mimic the terms 
that “the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap 
and all promises fully enforced.”37 
Common law agency doctrine thus offers one solution to the difficulty 
of aligning the interests of the agent with the principal: imposing an enfor-
ceable duty of loyalty on the agent.  Whether this duty is justified as moral-
ly required or as efficient contractual gap-filling, it arises because of the 
existence of a relationship to which the parties have assented and, to that 
extent, is consensual in origin.  The fact that the relationship is established 
by agreement also creates the possibility that the agency might be structured 
in a way that mitigates potential conflicts.  Thus, as discussed in the next 
section, economic theories have focused on the question whether or how 
contractual agreements can be used to better align the interests of the agent 
with that of the principal. 
B. The Economic Model 
  Economists have utilized principal–agent models to analyze a wide 
variety of private economic relationships, such as that between employer 
and employee,38 shareholder and manager,39 and landowner and tenant far-
mer.40  These models are related to but distinct from the legal concept of the 
principal–agent relationship.  Like the law of agency, economic theory is 
concerned with issues of monitoring and control within a consensual rela-
tionship.  Rather than designing legal rules to address the problem, howev-
er, economic theories ask how contractual incentives can be structured in 




37  Id. at 427; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991) (“Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that investors 
and managers would have reached if they could have bargained (and enforced their agreements) at no 
cost.”). 
38  See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to 
Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 20, 20 
(1978) (listing the employer–employee relationship as one that fits the “agency paradigm”); Terry M. 
Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 756 (1984) (same); David E.M. 
Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 45, 46 
(same). 
39  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agen-
cy Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and 
Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 66 (1979). 
40  See Sappington, supra note 38, at 45, 46–49.  
41  See Rasmusen, supra note 30, at 370 (“For the economist, the agency problem is how to give the 
agent incentives for the right action; for the lawyer, it is how to ‘mop up’ the damage once the agent has 
taken the wrong action.”). 
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they first identify more formally the structure of the contracting problem in 
various settings. 
The economic models share with the legal concept several core as-
sumptions.  The principal–agent relationship is conceived as a contractual 
one, in which the principal’s payoff is affected by the agent’s actions and in 
which the principal delegates decisionmaking authority to the agent.42  The 
agent is hired to achieve the principal’s purposes and, by her actions, is able 
to affect the principal’s interests.  In economic theories, however, the focus 
is not limited to actions that create legal obligations on the principal but is 
instead generalized to any situation in which the agent’s activities deter-
mine, at least in part, the outcome for the principal.43  Thus, the diligence of 
the employee will increase the productivity of the firm, the decisions of a 
manager will affect the return for shareholders, and the level of effort in-
vested by a tenant farmer will influence the crop yield for the landowner.  
In each of these cases, other factors—technological constraints, market 
conditions, levels of rainfall—will influence the outcome, but the agent’s 
activities will have an impact as well. 
Although the principal enters into the relationship in order to achieve 
certain purposes, the agent has her own private goals, which may conflict 
with those of the principal, and thus the problem for the principal is to de-
termine how best to motivate the agent to perform according to the princip-
al’s wishes.44  If the principal had complete information or if monitoring 
costs were zero, this problem would be trivial because the principal could 
effectively observe and punish any deviations.  However, because of the ex-
istence of private information, two types of problems arise: adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard.   
  The problem of adverse selection affects the contracting process be-




42  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308 (defining an agency relationship as “a contract un-
der which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some ser-
vice on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”); Moe, 
supra note 38, at 756 (“The principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the agency relationship, 
in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the 
agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired 
by the principal.”). 
43  See Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
203, 205 (2005) (identifying as one of the “core assumptions” of principal–agent models that the agent’s 
action determines in part the payoff to the principal); Shavell, supra note 39, at 55 (describing the prin-
cipal–agent relationship as one in which the agent’s effort, together with a random element, determines 
the outcome for the principal). 
44  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308 (discussing how the principal can limit divergences 
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent); Moe, supra note 38, at 756 (as-
serting that the essence of the principal’s problem is to design an incentive structure that makes pursuing 
the principal’s objectives advantageous for the agent); Sappington, supra note 38, at 45 (“The central 
concern is how the principal can best motivate the agent to perform as the principal would prefer, taking 
into account the difficulties in monitoring the agent’s activities.”); Shavell, supra note 39, at 55 (consi-
dering optimal fee arrangements to create appropriate incentives for an agent). 
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their skills, values, and objectives.45  The principal knows the type with 
which it desires to contract but cannot reliably detect the relevant informa-
tion.  For example, an employer may wish to hire someone who has a spe-
cialized skill and is highly motivated for a position involving substantial 
discretion and independent judgment.  It cannot know for certain whether 
any particular applicant has the desired qualities and must rely on proxies 
such as education and experience to make its hiring decisions.  Applicants 
who lack these qualities will have incentives to misrepresent their abilities, 
while highly qualified individuals may find it difficult to communicate 
credibly their true abilities and to distinguish themselves from less qualified 
applicants.46  To address this problem, the principal may attempt to structure 
the contract in a manner that screens for high-quality agents.  
Informational asymmetries plague the agency relationship after it has 
been formed as well.  The principal cannot directly observe the agent’s ac-
tivities, thereby creating a risk of moral hazard.47  Without accurate infor-
mation about the agent’s efforts, the principal must rely on proxy measures, 
which are necessarily imperfect.48  As a result, the agent may be tempted to 
shirk—that is, to pursue her own ends (e.g., taking fewer precautions or ex-
pending less effort)—rather than maximize the principal’s welfare.  The 
principal might rely on any of a number of mechanisms to discourage shirk-
ing, such as monitoring agent activity, requiring a bond on the part of the 
agent, implementing direct controls, or inducing the agent to share informa-
tion.  Each of these efforts, however, entails costs, and none can completely 
eliminate the slippage between the agent’s and the principal’s interests.  
Agency costs can thus be understood as the sum of the costs of agent shirk-
ing (residual loss) and the costs of efforts to control shirking (monitoring 
costs and bonding costs).49  The principal faces a basic optimization prob-
lem—how to structure the contract with the agent in a way that minimizes 
total agency costs. 
One common method for more closely aligning the agent’s interests 
with the principal’s is to compensate the agent based on outcome, which is 




45  See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
57, 61 (1989); Moe, supra note 38, at 754–55.  The problem of hidden information also arises after the 
agency relationship has been formed because the agent will likely have more information than the prin-
cipal about exogenous conditions that affect output.  See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 35 n.63 (1988). 
46  See Moe, supra note 38, at 754–55.   
47  See Eisenhardt, supra note 45, at 61; Moe, supra note 38, at 755. 
48  Moe, supra note 38, at 755.   
49  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 10; Jenson & Meckling, supra note 39, at 308.   
50  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 37, at 9 (noting that an alternative to monitoring is to 
give employees the right to share in the firm’s profits); TIROLE, supra note 45, at 36 (explaining that if 
the agent’s compensation depends on the outcome, the agent will have an incentive to pick the optimal 
action); see also Sappington, supra note 38, at 47 (explaining that the principal can motivate the agent 
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averse, as is commonly assumed in these models,51 she will require addi-
tional compensation to bear the risk.52  If the principal agrees to share the 
risk in order to induce her to accept the agency, the full costs of shirking 
will no longer be borne by the agent and the problem of moral hazard reap-
pears.53  Thus, “[E]fficiency in incentives must be traded off against effi-
ciency in risk-bearing . . . .”54  Even though agency costs cannot be 
eliminated entirely, “the principal’s optimal incentive structure for the agent 
is one in which the latter receives some share of the residual in payment for 
his efforts, thus giving him a direct stake in the outcome.”55   
In the above analysis, the concept of the “residual” is central in shaping 
incentives for the agent.  It is the prospect of an economic surplus—one that 
can be allocated between the principal and the agent—that offers the possi-
bility of reducing the gap between the agent’s private incentives and the 
principal’s goals, thereby mitigating the problem of moral hazard.  In the 
context of private contracting, it is a reasonable assumption that the goal of 
the principal is to maximize profit.  Thus, the employer wants to maximize 
the productive output of the firm, the shareholders seek to maximize the 
value of the firm, and the landowner aims to maximize the crop yield.  In 
each of these settings, the nature of the residual is easily conceptualized.  
As will be discussed below, however, applying the notion of a residual in 
the context of a public hierarchy like the court system is neither obvious nor 
straightforward. 
In sum, the economics literature focuses on the optimal contractual ar-
rangements for minimizing agency costs.56  This literature highlights the 
problems that result from informational asymmetries and emphasizes that 
any mechanisms intended to address these problems necessarily entail other 
costs.  Designing optimal institutional structures therefore requires balanc-
ing residual losses against the costs of implementing more stringent instru-
ments to monitor and control the agent.  Although contractual incentives 
and institutional structures can be used to mitigate conflicts of interest, the 
slippage between the agent’s and the principal’s interests cannot be elimi-
nated entirely. 
                                                                                                                 
“by making the agent the residual claimant in the relationship”); Shavell, supra note 39, at 59 (positing 
that for a risk-neutral agent the optimal fee schedule pays the agent the outcome minus a constant).   
51  See Eisenhardt, supra note 45, at 60–61 (explaining that agents are assumed to be more risk 
averse because they cannot diversify their employment). 
52  See Sappington, supra note 38, at 49.  
53  See id. at 49–50 (noting that when the agent is effectively insured against bad outcomes, he will 
exert less effort); Shavell, supra note 39, at 56. 
54  Miller, supra note 43, at 206.   
55  Moe, supra note 38, at 763. 
56  See Sappington, supra note 38, at 45 (listing “design of individualized contracts” as one of the 
“major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives”); Shavell, supra note 39 (studying 
optimal arrangements for payment in agency relationships).  But see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, 
at 305–06 (using agency theory to explain the ownership structure of firms in a positive rather than nor-
mative project). 
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C. The Political Model 
Over the past several decades, political scientists have drawn on eco-
nomic models of agency to describe the relationship between administrative 
agencies and their political superiors.  Earlier work on this bureaucracy em-
phasized the agencies’ apparent independence, noting that Congress paid 
little attention to their activities and invested few resources in monitoring 
them.57  Oversight hearings were haphazard, infrequent, and often superfi-
cial.58  Even when they did occur, members of Congress typically lacked the 
technical expertise and detailed understanding of an agency’s operations to 
effectively evaluate its activities.59  These observations led scholars to as-
sume that congressional oversight was ineffectual and to bemoan the lack of 
accountability of the large federal bureaucracy.60 
Drawing on insights from principal–agent theory, Barry Weingast and 
others offered an alternative account of the relationship between Congress 
and the administrative bureaucracy.  They argued that members of Congress 
“possess sufficient rewards and sanctions to create an incentive system for 
agencies”61 and identified several levers of control: authority over appropri-
ations, the threat of ex post sanctioning through the use of oversight hear-
ings, new legislation restricting agency activities, and congressional 
influence over the appointment and reappointment of agency officials.62  To 




57  See LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
170–73 (1979) (asserting that “congressional attention to bureaucratic agencies is haphazard” and that 
“the committees most responsible for oversight . . . fail to devote the bulk of their hearings to investiga-
tions of agencies”); MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY: STUDIES IN 
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION 182, 186 (1976) (finding that members of Congress see oversight as less 
central than other work, and noting that legislative oversight is neither comprehensive nor systematic); 
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 388 (James Q. Wil-
son ed., 1980) (arguing that neither the White House nor Congress closely scrutinizes agencies). 
58  See OGUL, supra note 57, at 193 (summarizing criticisms that legislative oversight “has been spo-
radic, atomized, erratic, trivial, ineffective, or some combination of these”). 
59  See DODD & SCHOTT, supra note 57, at 2 (explaining that “agencies are staffed by special-
ists . . . [whose] expertise . . . [and] technical facilities for data collection and analysis . . . allow[] them 
to bring to policy struggles an authority and knowledge that is difficult for members of Congress, presi-
dents, or political appointees to match”). 
60  See id. (describing the administrative state as a “prodigal child . . . [whose] muscle and 
brawn . . . challeng[e] [Congress and the President] for hegemony in the national political system”); id. 
at 248 (predicting that “[s]o long as Congress attempts to conduct oversight through the current commit-
tee and subcommittee system, . . . congressional committees will probably preoccupy themselves with 
intra-congressional struggles that leave the bureaucracy broad latitude”); OGUL, supra note 57, at 185 
(concluding that congressional influence over agencies is “scattered and slight”); Wilson, supra note 57, 
at 391 (arguing that administrative agencies “operate with substantial autonomy, at least with respect to 
congressional or executive direction”). 
61  Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regu-
latory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768 (1983). 
62  Id. at 769–70; Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent 
Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 155–57 (1984). 
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tual punishments need take place for the threat to be effective,”63 and thus 
low levels of active congressional oversight are consistent with a situation 
in which congressional preferences effectively control agency behavior.64  
Moreover, direct monitoring is not necessary because affected constituents 
will monitor and report problems, thereby sounding a “fire alarm” to alert 
Congress to noncompliant agency actions.65  These theories drew clear les-
sons from economic models of agency:  
[T]he issue of congressional control of the bureaucracy has many of the same 
issues present in the debate over separation of ownership and control: little os-
tensible interest on the part of shareholders is consistent with . . . a strong set 
of incentive mechanisms that obviate the need for direct shareholder monitor-
ing.66   
Although recognizing that agency costs cannot be eliminated entirely, 
they argue that institutional forms evolve to mitigate these problems and 
will persist so long as the benefits of the agency arrangements outweigh any 
costs.67 
Subsequent work in this area shifted attention from monitoring and in-
centives to structural and procedural constraints.  Concerned that “a system 




63  Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 767 n.2. 
64  Id. at 767, 793; see also Weingast, supra note 62, at 148 (arguing that Congress has developed an 
effective system for controlling agencies that involves little direct monitoring).  Another elaboration of 
the basic principal–agent model involves recognition that administrative agencies may be subject to the 
control of multiple principals.  Congress is neither a unitary actor nor the lone actor, and thus a number 
of scholars have incorporated distinct legislative actors—relevant House and Senate committees, House 
floor, Senate floor—and a chief executive officer into “multiple principal” models.  These extensions 
have led some to argue that competition among principals may create greater room for bureaucratic dis-
cretion.  See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance,” 
12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475, 482 (1987) (”[P]rincipals compete for influence over the agency—which, as a 
result . . . [is] attracted to strategies that play its principals off against one another.”).  Others have found 
that the degree of control over the bureaucracy depends on the circumstances and that even with mul-
tiple principals bureaucratic agencies may implement policies that reflect the preferences of elected offi-
cials.  See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 589, 604–05 (1989) (modeling interactions be-
tween the executive and legislature and bureaucratic agents and concluding that under favorable condi-
tions, bureaucrats will follow the policies of elected officials); Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, 
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, 
and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
119, 163 (1996) (arguing that the interactions between the President and Congress can create more or 
less autonomy for agencies).  
65  See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171–76 (1984) (arguing that “direct, centralized 
surveillance” of agencies analogous to police patrols will be less effective in furthering Congress’s poli-
cy goals than will “comparatively decentralized and incentive based” models of oversight analogous to 
fire alarms). 
66  Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 767 n.2. 
67  See Weingast, supra note 62, at 153–54. 
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to the control problem,”68 Mathew McCubbins and others argued that Con-
gress seeks to control bureaucracies prospectively by creating structural ar-
rangements that constrain an agency’s substantive discretion.69  For 
example, Congress prescribes the regulatory scope of an agency and the le-
gal tools or instruments the agency may use to achieve its goals.70  Similar-
ly, Congress may impose procedural requirements designed to reflect the 
competing political interests at the time the legislation was passed71 or to 
“stack the deck” to benefit a favored constituency.72  In other words, when 
establishing a regulatory agency, Congress chooses administrative struc-
tures and procedural requirements in an attempt to ensure that the agency’s 
policy outputs will be consistent with Congress’s preferences at that time, 
rather than relying primarily on oversight and ex post rewards and punish-
ments to control the agency.73 
The theoretical innovation of applying principal–agent models to the 
public bureaucracy provoked a great deal of empirical work, much of it in-
tended to test the theory of “congressional dominance”—the claim that 
members of Congress controlled sufficient incentives to effectively influ-




68  Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as In-
struments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 249 (1987). 
69  See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 721, 722 (1985); McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 68, at 254; Matthew D. McCubbins, 
Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Ar-
rangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440 (1989).  
70  See McCubbins, supra note 69, at 725–27. 
71  See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 69, at 444. 
72  Id.; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 68, at 261.  McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast pro-
vide a number of examples of deck-stacking.  For example, “cumbersome procedures . . . favor . . . well-
organized, well-financed interests.”  Id. at 262.  The burden of proof “determin[es] which side will be 
given the benefit of the doubt.”  Id.  Additionally, Congress can limit an agency’s ability to set its own 
rulemaking agenda.  Id. at 267.  Congress may even “subsidize” participation by particular interest 
groups to ensure their input into agency decisions.  Id. at 266. 
73  See McCubbins, supra note 69, at 744 (hypothesizing that “Congress as the principal selects an 
institutional arrangement with its agent so as to maximize the benefit it derives from the agent’s perfor-
mance”).  This emphasis on ex ante structural and procedural controls departs from traditional agency 
theory, which focuses on monitoring and incentives.  As Gary Miller writes:  
The directors of a firm clearly specify to the CEO that they expect[] profits—but they do not con-
strain the CEO by specifying a particular procedure, especially one that may benefit a single subset 
of investors.  Any such procedure would only constrain the profit-maximizing activities of the 
CEO, and would require constant monitoring either by the board (which is unlikely) or by an ex-
ternal court system (equally unlikely).  As a result, the procedural-control argument, although it 
has been extremely productive of innovative research in political science, represents a discontinui-
ty with PAT, rather than a simple extension of it. 
Miller, supra note 43, at 215; see also Edgar Kiser, Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Econom-
ics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation, 17 SOC. 
THEORY 146, 156 (1999) (noting that the role of administrative procedures is largely absent from the 
economics agency literature). 
74  Weingast, supra note 62, at 148 (“The mechanisms evolved by Congress over the past one hun-
dred years comprise an ingenious system for control of agencies that involves little direct congressional 
monitoring of decisions but which nonetheless results in policies desired by Congress.”). 
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with some studies finding support for the theory that agency actions are 
shaped by congressional preferences,75 while others have concluded that 
certain agencies are relatively unconstrained in their ability to pursue their 
own goals.76  Still other empirical studies have focused more specifically on 
whether particular structural controls or procedural requirements are effec-
tive in constraining and guiding agency discretion, again with mixed re-
sults.77   
Although most of the work in this area is ostensibly positive in nature, 
it is motivated by a deeper normative concern about policymaking by un-
elected bureaucrats.  As Weingast argues, “Voters and citizens are the ulti-
mate principals of the policymaking process, and congressmen are their 
agents.”78  Elected officials face frequent reelection, creating incentives for 
them to act in the interests of their constituents.  In the modern administra-
tive state, however, these elected officials delegate significant authority to 
bureaucratic agencies to articulate and implement public policy.  The bu-
reaucratic officials who staff these agencies thus wield significant power to 
shape policies that affect the public interest, yet they are not directly ans-
werable to any voting constituency and do not have to face reelection.  This 
situation raises concerns about whether their policy decisions reflect the in-
terests and preferences of the electorate.79  Thus, determining whether and 
how elected officials control agency policymaking is closely related to 
questions about the legitimacy of bureaucratic actions.   
Even though the principal–agent model has become a widely accepted 
tool for studying Congress–agency relations, some cautionary notes have 
been raised.  In particular, Terry Moe argues that contractual theories of or-
ganization, like the principal–agent paradigm, “developed with reference to 




75  See, e.g., id. at 181 (concluding that “[t]he evidence presented shows that Congress played the 
key role in the change in SEC policy” regarding deregulation); Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 
791 (concluding that Congress has “substantial . . . influence” over the FTC); B. Dan Wood & Richard 
W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 821 
(1991) (finding evidence of political control over seven different federal agencies). 
76  See, e.g., B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 229 (1988) (concluding that “a principal-agent model fail[s] to explain the 
longitudinal variations in EPA clean air outputs” and that bureaucracies “are themselves responsible for 
much of the variation and substance of public policy through time”). 
77  Compare Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 670–71 (1998) (failing to find empirical support for the theory that the no-
tice-and-comment process will favor certain constituencies in the manner posited by the deck-stacking 
thesis), with David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agen-
cies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 445–46 (1999) (finding empirical support for the claim that structural 
choices and, to a lesser extent, procedural controls affect agency decisionmaking, although the effects 
were not necessarily foreseen by political officials). 
78  Weingast, supra note 62, at 151. 
79  See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 68, at 243 (raising the concern that unelected bu-
reaucrats will not comply with the political preferences of elected officials); Weingast, supra note 62, at 
151 (asking whether bureaucratic agencies serve congressional constituents or their own interests). 
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fundamental components must be modified if its application to public or-
ganizations is to be meaningful and instructive.”80  He points out that politi-
cians, whose role is analogized to that of the entrepreneur, are not primarily 
motivated by productive efficiency but by electoral considerations.81  Thus, 
they are not “in the conventional sense, seeking an optimally balanced set 
of hierarchical controls and monitoring mechanisms.”82  Similarly, bureau-
cratic officials are not primarily seeking to maximize their own profit but 
may be driven by a number of motivations: “budgets, slack, policy, career 
opportunities, and security.”83  This “expanded set of motivators” makes it 
more difficult to predict with confidence the efficacy of various controls 
and incentives.84  Moe notes additional difficulties: public agencies are not 
subject to the discipline of the market;85 they create no economic surplus 
analogous to the residual in the private firm that can be used to shape incen-
tives;86 and political officials are severely constrained in their ability to se-
lect agents and design incentive structures, especially compared with the 
entrepreneur of the economic models.87  Thus, he concludes that “there are 
good reasons for thinking that bureaucratic control is much different for the 
public sector than the private sector, and that a straightforward application 
of contractual [principal–agent] theories and their implications is likely to 
be very misleading.”88 
III.  PRINCIPAL–AGENT THEORY AND THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY 
As Moe argues, the facile analogy between the private and public bu-
reaucracy overlooks important differences between the two, such that ap-
plying the principal–agent model in the latter context may be misleading.  
The risks are even greater when principal–agent theory is applied to the 
judicial hierarchy, which differs even more significantly from the economic 
model.  In this Part, I first explore the fit between principal–agent theories 
and the realities of the federal judicial branch.  Next, I consider how relying 
on a principal–agent model may obscure important normative questions and 




80  Moe, supra note 38, at 761.  
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  See id. at 764. 
84  See id. 
85  Id. at 762. 
86  Id. at 763.  Moe argues that “slack is not a functional substitute for the economic residual.”  Id. at 
764.  Unlike the residual for a firm, which results from greater efficiency, slack, by definition, becomes 
more available as the operation becomes more inefficient.  Thus, utilizing slack to motivate bureaucrats 
has “its own distinctive consequences for bureaucratic efficiency and control.”  Id. 
87  See id. at 765.  Further difficulties in effectively using control mechanisms arise because Con-
gress cannot foresee the policy issues an agency will face in the future.  See David B. Spence, Agency 
Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 199, 203–04, 206 (1997). 
88  Moe, supra note 38, at 765.  
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A. Assessing Theory Fit 
Each of the three conceptions of agency explored above takes a differ-
ent perspective on the relationship: legal doctrine focuses on the extent of 
the legal duty owed by an agent to her principal; economic theories aim to 
determine what forms of contracting will minimize agency costs; and work 
in political science asks about the extent of control that political principals 
in fact exercise over their bureaucratic agents.  Though focused on different 
questions, these conceptions of the principal–agent relationship share cer-
tain core elements and offer a number of insights and analytic tools for 
studying hierarchical relationships.  More specifically, they emphasize the 
difficulty of controlling the actions of the agent given conflicts of interest 
between agent and principal and highlight the role of informational asym-
metries in allowing agents to shirk.  In addition, they suggest the signific-
ance of monitoring and outcome-based incentives in shaping agent 
behavior. 
In many ways, the federal judicial hierarchy resembles the types of re-
lationships fruitfully analyzed under principal–agent theories.  Whether its 
primary function is understood as dispute resolution or announcing legal 
principles, the Supreme Court cannot possibly fulfill this role alone.  The 
hundreds of federal district and court of appeals judges are crucial for re-
solving the hundreds of thousands of disputes brought to federal court an-
nually, and their application of legal doctrines across a wide variety of 
factual settings is essential to give meaning to the law.  Although the Su-
preme Court does not literally delegate its work to the lower courts, it clear-
ly stands in a hierarchical relationship to them, exercising supervisory 
authority over them.  It is empowered to reverse individual decisions and to 
establish precedent that the lower courts are obligated to follow.89   
Analogizing this structure to an agency relationship highlights the chal-
lenges confronting the Supreme Court.  As judicial politics scholars have 
emphasized, lower court judges do not necessarily share the goals and poli-
cy preferences of the Supreme Court.  The resulting value conflicts mean 
that the Supreme Court faces the classic problem of the principal—ensuring 
that the lower courts pursue its interests and not their own.  As in the tradi-
tional contracting situation, the Court cannot provide complete, detailed in-
structions directing the lower courts how to decide in every instance.  Due 
to some combination of the limitations of language, an inability to antic-
ipate issues, and a need for flexibility in application, Court precedent in-





89  See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 817, 823–25 (1994) (explaining the doctrine of hierarchical precedent). 
90  See Kim, supra note 8, at 408–17.  Similarly, the need to accommodate differing views among 
the Justices or uncertainty about the best rule over a broad range of cases may limit the Court’s ability to 
give comprehensive directions to the lower courts through its opinions.  See id.  
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The possibility of “moral hazard” arises because lower court judges 
may have different goals than the Supreme Court and, at the same time, 
have a great deal more information about their actions than their judicial 
superiors.  Although in theory the Supreme Court can monitor individual 
decisions and reverse those with which it disagrees, its ability to do so is 
constrained by its limited resources and the requirement that a party must 
first petition for certiorari.  Due to the sheer volume of lower court activity, 
the Supreme Court is unlikely to know much about any particular decision 
unless one of the parties petitions for certiorari.  Even then, the Court must 
sort through thousands of petitions, from which it selects fewer than one 
hundred to decide on the merits each year.91  Given these constraints, the 
lower courts have an informational advantage, which may permit them to 
pursue their own goals rather than the Supreme Court’s.  Thus, principal–
agent theory usefully highlights the existence of value conflicts within the 
judicial hierarchy and the role of informational asymmetries in giving lower 
court judges opportunities to depart from Supreme Court preferences. 
Upon closer examination, however, many of the core elements of the 
principal–agent relationship apply to the federal judiciary only with some 
strain.  Take, for example, the consensual basis of the agency relationship.  
In both legal doctrine and economic theory, agency depends upon the par-
ties’ assent to a particular type of relationship.92  The lawyer, employee, or 
manager is an agent because she has agreed to act on behalf of the client, 
employer, or shareholders.  And although elected officials do not enter into 
explicit contracts with bureaucratic officials, the members of Congress who 
create an agency, define its mission, and then participate in appointing its 
leaders have an implicit relational contract with the members of the bureau-
cracy.   
By contrast, the Supreme Court does not contract with federal appellate 
and trial judges in any meaningful sense.  It does not appoint circuit or dis-
trict judges and cannot structure the terms of their appointments.  Instead, 
the relationships between the various levels of the federal judiciary are 
structured by Congress, within the bounds set by the Constitution.93  It is 
Congress that authorizes the creation of the lower federal courts,94 funds 




91  In recent years, the percentage of petitions granted review by the Supreme Court has hovered 
around 1% of all cases and 4% of the paid docket.  The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 389 tbl.II(B) (2009); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—The Statistics, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 523 tbl.II(B) (2008); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—The Statistics, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 436, 444 tbl.II(B) (2007).   
92  See supra Part II.A–B.  
93  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).  
94  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).  
95  See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutio-
nalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 984–86 (2002) (describing Congress’s power over 
the judiciary’s budget).    
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it is the President, with the approval of the Senate, who selects the individu-
als who staff them.97  Thus, the Supreme Court lacks any direct role in es-
tablishing, structuring, or staffing the lower federal courts that is 
comparable to either the economic principal’s contracting power or Con-
gress’s ability to create and shape administrative agencies and to participate 
in the selection of their leaders. 
The absence of a consent-based relationship between the Supreme 
Court and lower federal courts matters for agency theory because many of 
the usual tools for minimizing agency costs are unavailable.  One strategy 
employed by principals to combat the problem of adverse selection is to 
choose a form of contract more likely to attract high quality agents, which 
can reduce monitoring and other costs down the road.  Similarly, the Con-
gress–bureaucracy literature highlights the selection of loyal bureaucratic 
agents as one method of exercising political control over agencies.98  In the 
context of the judicial hierarchy, however, the Supreme Court does not try 
to ensure the appointment of loyal “agents” because it simply has no direct 
role in the selection process.  To the extent that there is an adverse selection 
problem, it is one that confronts the political branches responsible for se-
lecting and appointing federal judges.  And depending upon existing politi-
cal alignments, the political branches may seek to determine the true “type” 
of a judicial nominee in an effort to select lower court judges who do not 
share the goals of the sitting Supreme Court.99  To the extent that the con-
cept of adverse selection has any relevance to the judicial hierarchy, it sug-
gests that the President and Congress should be regarded as the principals 
of the lower federal court judges. 
The contracting process is also important in traditional principal–agent 
theories because it enables the principal to structure the relationship in a 
way that better aligns the agent’s incentives with the principal’s interests.  
Principals use a variety of carrots and sticks to reward effort and punish 
shirking.  In the case of the judicial hierarchy, however, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
96  See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1292 (2006) (defining the ju-
risdiction of the courts of appeals); id. §§ 1331–1338 (establishing the original jurisdiction of the district 
courts).    
97  28 U.S.C. § 44 (empowering the President, with “the advice and consent of the Senate,” to ap-
point federal circuit judges); id. § 133 (prescribing the same for federal district judges).  
98  See, e.g., Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast, supra note 64, at 604–05.  
99  The President and Senate are likely to seek appointment of federal judges who reflect their cur-
rent preferences.  To the extent that those preferences diverge from those of the sitting Supreme Court, 
they will not be seeking to appoint faithful agents of the Supreme Court but rather lower court judges 
who are likely to resist pursuing the Supreme Court’s preferences.  McNollgast has suggested that the 
political branches might “pack” the lower courts in order to force the Supreme Court to alter doctrine 
with which the political branches disagree.  See McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1634.  Of course, this anal-
ysis assumes that the President and the Senate pursue policy goals in the judicial appointments process, 
begging the normative question of what “type” they ought to be seeking when appointing federal judges.  
Other personal characteristics such as integrity, judicial temperament, and legal ability should also be 
relevant.   
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has none of the usual levers of control to shape the incentives of lower court 
judges.  It cannot promote, demote, or fire them; raise or lower their com-
pensation; or determine the conditions of their employment.  The only sanc-
tion available to the Supreme Court is its ability to reverse decisions with 
which it disagrees. 
Many principal–agent models regard reversal as a disciplinary tool.100  
However, reversal alone is insufficient to ensure compliance with the Su-
preme Court’s goals where the lower federal courts have differing goals.  In 
any given case, the actual risk of reversal is quite low.  The Supreme Court 
currently reviews less than 1% of court of appeals decisions,101 and district 
court decisions have an even lower chance of review by the Supreme 
Court.102  Of course, the Court need not actually reverse in order to have an 
effect on lower court decisionmaking.  The threat of reversal may be suffi-
cient to induce lower courts to comply.  As Songer, Segal, and Cameron 
have suggested, “[T]he ‘paradox’ of (relatively) effective control and rare 
reversals is more apparent than real” because appeals courts anticipate re-
versal and therefore comply without the need for the Supreme Court to ac-
tually review and reverse.103  In order for the threat of sanction to be 
effective, however, it must be a credible threat, and yet the Supreme Court’s 
capacity for increasing the number of cases it reviews is quite limited rela-




100  See, e.g., Benesh & Reddick, supra note 1, at 536; Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 
102; George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822; Randazzo, supra note 1, at 673; Songer, Segal & Cameron, 
supra note 1, at 693. 
101  For example, in 2008, the United States courts of appeals terminated 28,918 cases on the merits, 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 12 tbl.B-5 
(Dec. 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederal 
Judiciary/2008/dec08/B05Dec08.pdf, while the Supreme Court accepted only 87 cases for review in the 
October 2008 term, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, supra note 91, at 389 tbl.II(B).  
Even if all the cases in which certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court came from the federal circuit 
courts, the rate of review would be about 0.3%.  Cf. id. (using the Court’s 2008 total number of cases 
granted certiorari to calculate the percentage).  Given that some of these cases involved appeals from 
decisions by state supreme courts, the rate of review of federal circuit court decisions is even lower. 
102  The percentage of United States district court cases ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court is 
even lower because of the much higher caseload volume in the district courts.  For example, in 2008, the 
district courts terminated by court action more than 178,000 civil actions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 37 tbl.C-4 (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/C04De
c08.pdf, and adjudicated nearly 72,000 criminal cases, id. at 51 tbl.D-1, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/D01C
Dec08.pdf.  Of these, less than 0.04% are likely to ever be reviewed by the Supreme Court.  Cf. The Su-
preme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, supra note 91, at 389 tbl.II(B) (using the total number of cases 
to which the Court granted certiorari in 2008 to calculate the percentage).  
103  Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 693. 
104  Commentators have noted the Supreme Court’s reduced plenary docket in recent years and de-
bated its causes and consequences.  See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The 
Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrun-
ken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403; David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule 
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Even an infrequent sanction may be effective if the costs it imposes are 
sufficiently large.  In the case of reversal, the primary cost to the lower 
court judge is the loss of her preferred outcome, which is identical to the 
loss she would have experienced if she had decided according to the Su-
preme Court’s preference in the first place.  Thus, fear of reversal can oper-
ate as an effective sanction only if it imposes other costs—such as 
damaging a judge’s reputation or decreasing her chances for promotion.105  
Although judges undoubtedly dislike being reversed, it is unclear that they 
actually suffer reputational harm or lost opportunities as a result or that the 
costs of reversal are significant enough to dominate other judicial motiva-
tions.106  The handful of relevant empirical studies have failed to find evi-
dence that fear of reversal drives lower court decisionmaking.107  Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s reversal power alone is arguably a weak tool for ensuring 
compliance across the mass of cases decided by the lower federal courts. 
When monitoring is difficult in the private contracting situation, one 
common solution is to compensate the agent in part based on outcome, the-
reby giving the agent an incentive to work hard in order to share in a larger 
residual.108  Moe points out, however, that “[f]or public bureaucra-
                                                                                                                 
of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997); 
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2006).  Although the Court could likely increase the number of cases it hears each 
year, it nevertheless faces significant resource constraints given the volume of lower court decisions.  
Even if the Supreme Court increased its output five-fold—a heroic assumption—it could still only re-
view about 1.5% of federal court of appeals cases decided on the merits.  See supra note 101. 
105  See, e.g., Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 102 (asserting that frequent reversal brings 
derision of colleagues and decline in professional status); George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing 
that lower court judges believe that their chance of promotion depends upon reversal rates). 
106  See JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 44–45 (2002) (concluding, in 
part based on interviews with circuit judges, that federal appellate judges are not motivated significantly 
by either a fear of reversal or a desire to be appointed to a higher court); Kim, supra note 8, at 401–02 
(questioning whether reversals in fact harm judges’ reputations or prospects for promotion); Richard A. 
Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 1, 14 (1993) (“Judges don’t like to be reversed (I speak from experience), but aversion to 
reversal does not figure largely in the judicial utility function.”). 
107  See, e.g., DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 126 
(2002) (reporting results of various empirical tests that offered “essentially no evidence that [courts of 
appeals’ deference to Supreme Court preferences] results from fear of reversal”); Richard S. Higgins & 
Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 130, 137–38 (1980) (finding no evidence that 
judges who are more likely to be eligible for promotion are more sensitive to the risk of reversal); David 
E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 579, 600–03 (2003) (finding no evidence that circuit courts follow Supreme Court prefe-
rences more closely in cases that are more likely to be reviewed and hence pose a greater risk of reversal 
but concluding that the lower courts generally adhere to Supreme Court preferences despite the low 
chance of reversal); Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn & Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow 
the Law When There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137, 138 (2003) (concluding that circuit 
judges generally followed the law in diversity cases, even though the risk of review and reversal in these 
types of cases is negligible).  
108  See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
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cy . . . there is no residual in the ordinary sense.”109  Policy outcomes are not 
functionally equivalent to an economic surplus because they cannot be dis-
tributed in the same way, and this observation applies to the judicial hie-
rarchy as well.  Judicial politics scholars assume that judges seek to 
maximize their preferred policies, just as private economic actors try to 
maximize their wealth.  The policy outputs they produce, though, are not 
the functional equivalent of a firm’s residual.  For the lower court judge 
who disagrees with the Supreme Court’s policy, it is no reward to be al-
lowed to share in any policy surplus created by faithful adherence to the 
Supreme Court’s wishes.  Thus, the usual economic strategy of compensat-
ing based on outcome is unlikely to be effective where the agent’s interests 
do not diverge from the principal’s because the agent wishes to expend less 
effort but because a fundamental value conflict exists. 
In the federal judicial hierarchy, then, almost none of the usual tools 
for shaping agent incentives are available to the Supreme Court.  It cannot 
influence the compensation or job tenure of lower court judges, and there is 
no residual with which to reward faithful effort.  In some ways this situation 
reverses the logic of the economic theories.  In traditional principal–agent 
relationships, the principal cannot alter the outcome—which is determined 
in part by the actions of the agent—and so it uses incentives to induce the 
agent to produce the desired outcome.  In the case of the Supreme Court, 
the opposite is true—it has the ability to reverse outcomes it dislikes but 
generally lacks the ability to structure incentives for lower court judges 
prospectively. 
Principal–agent theory proves an awkward fit with the federal judicial 
hierarchy in another way as well.  As discussed above, one of the core as-
pects of agency relationships is that the agent has the power to impact the 
interests of the principal.  In common law agency relationships, this power 
consists of the agent’s ability to legally bind the principal, altering its rights 
and obligations vis-à-vis third parties.110  In economic theories, the concept 
of impact is much broader, encompassing any situation in which the agent’s 
actions (together with some exogenous element) will determine the out-
come and hence the payoff to the principal.111  For example, greater effort 
on the part of a manager will increase profits for the shareholders, while 
shirking or self-dealing will reduce the surplus.  The Congress–bureaucracy 
literature departs from the assumption that the parties are wealth-
maximizing and assumes instead that elected officials are interested in re-
election.  On this view, the activities of bureaucratic agents impact the in-
terests of their political principal to the extent that their actions please or 




109  See Moe, supra note 38, at 763. 
110  See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
111  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
112  See Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 768 (explaining that members of Congress “gauge the 
success of [agency] programs through their constituents’ reactions”); Weingast, supra note 62, at 151 
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tions, however, it is the agent’s impact on the principal’s interests that mo-
tivates and justifies the latter’s efforts to exercise control. 
Applying principal–agent theory to the judicial hierarchy raises a ques-
tion—in what ways do the actions of lower court judges impact the interests 
of the Supreme Court?  The answer to that question in turn depends upon 
how one understands the interests of the Court.  Certainly, there is no im-
pact on the Justices’ individual material interests, for nothing that lower 
court judges do will affect either the compensation or the tenure of Supreme 
Court Justices.  Judicial politics scholars instead assume that the goal of 
judges—their true interest—is to enact their policy preferences through 
their decisions.113  But this assumption requires further elaboration.  Unlike 
Congress, the Supreme Court is not explicitly cast as a policymaking body.  
Instead, what the Court does is decide cases, and in doing so, it establishes 
doctrine—precedent—that often embodies certain policy choices.  What, 
then, does it mean for lower court decisions to impact the Court’s inter-
ests—i.e., its policy goals?  If the Supreme Court has decided a case that es-
tablishes a certain doctrine, are its interests adversely affected if a lower 
court applies the doctrine but reaches a different substantive outcome?  Or 
are its interests harmed only if the lower court refuses to apply the doctrine 
at all? 
To take a concrete example, in Garcetti v. Ceballos the Supreme Court 
rejected the claim of a district attorney who alleged that his First Amend-
ment rights had been violated when he was disciplined for writing a memo 
critical of the actions of the police during an investigation.114  Although it 
had previously held that the First Amendment protects public employees 
when they speak out on matters of public concern,115 the Court in Garcetti 
held that when public employees speak “pursuant to their official duties, 
[they] are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,” and 
therefore, their speech is not constitutionally protected.116  Because the dis-
trict attorney had prepared the memo as part of his official duties, his claim 
was dismissed.117  Suppose, in a subsequent case, a lower court rejected the 
Supreme Court’s Garcetti holding, or simply ignored it, thereby permitting 
a public employee to claim retaliation based on speech made pursuant to her 
                                                                                                                 
(asking whether agencies benefit congressional constituencies and hence provide electoral benefits to 
members of Congress).  The impact of bureaucratic action on the interests of political officials, however, 
is indirect; it depends upon whether public attention is focused on the bureaucracy and on the degree to 
which elected officials are viewed as responsible for agency outputs.  See McCubbins & Schwartz, su-
pra note 65, at 167–68 (explaining how members of Congress maximize support by remedying viola-
tions brought to their attention by supporters rather than by searching out violations that supporters do 
not know about and thus cannot reward them for remedying).   
113  See supra note 4. 
114  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415–17 (2006).  
115  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144–46 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
568–70 (1968). 
116  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
117  See id. at 421–24. 
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official duties.  Such a decision would clearly have a negative impact on the 
Supreme Court’s interest in establishing its policy, not to mention that it 
would violate well-established legal norms.  But suppose instead that a 
lower court cites and applies the holding in Garcetti and then concludes that 
the public employee’s speech that forms the basis of the claim was not 
made “pursuant to official duties” and allows the claim to proceed.118  Its 
decision is arguably consistent with Garcetti’s reasoning and therefore does 
not violate legal norms, but by permitting the plaintiff’s claim, it reaches an 
outcome different from that in Garcetti.  Does such a decision impact the 
Supreme Court’s interests?   
If the Supreme Court’s interest lies in establishing the general policy, 
then the answer would seem to be “no.”  The lower court has affirmed and 
applied the policy set out by the Court—“no First Amendment protection 
for speech made pursuant to official duties”—although perhaps its applica-
tion differs from what the Court would have decided in the same case.  The 
Court’s goals, however, might be understood more broadly—that is, its in-
terests might be defined to include not only having its precedents followed 
but also having outcomes in the lower courts coincide with its preferences.  
On this view, the Supreme Court’s interests would be impaired by the lower 
court that applied the Garcetti holding as written but interpreted it to permit 
a public employee’s claim to go forward where the Court would not have 
allowed it.119 
Of course the Supreme Court might have given clearer instructions if it 
cared only about outcome—for example, establishing a blanket rule that 
public employee speech is not protected by the First Amendment or is only 
protected if it does not fall within the employee’s written job description.  
Instead, the Garcetti opinion suggested that a mechanical test based on 
written job descriptions is inappropriate and stated that determining the 
scope of an employee’s official duties is a “practical” inquiry.120  By quali-
fying its holding in this way, the Court deliberately left open some discre-
tionary space in which the exercise of judgment by lower court judges is not 




118  See, e.g., Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that plaintiff’s al-
legations of “corrupt overpayment schemes” were not part of his official job duties as chief engineer); 
Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 897–98 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that the plaintiff’s speech—
complaints that the defendant violated state open meetings law—was not part of his job duties as public 
works director); cf. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that a 
police officer’s testimony at the trial of a fellow officer is speech as a citizen and that his claim of retali-
ation for that speech therefore was not foreclosed by Garcetti). 
119  This control over outcomes is what many judicial politics scholars assume represents the Su-
preme Court’s interests, and they therefore characterize divergent outcomes as “shirking.”  See, e.g., 
Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 692–93; see also George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 822 (rai-
sing the concern that  “lower court judges may make decisions that are different from those that the 
Court would otherwise have made”). 
120  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
121  See Kim, supra note 8, at 442. 
105:535  (2011) Beyond Principal–Agent Theories 
 561
nary space, is the lower court judge who applies the doctrine but reaches a 
different substantive outcome acting contrary to the Court’s policy goals or 
not?  Because the Court, by definition, has not issued a clear policy state-
ment in this area, it is difficult to tell.  The point here is that defining the 
principal’s interest as a policy goal—rather than an economic one—
complicates the idea that the agent’s actions can impact the principal’s in-
terests.122  In the case of the judicial hierarchy, it becomes more difficult to 
determine whether a particular lower court decision advances the Supreme 
Court’s interests or constitutes “shirking.”  
B.  Limitations of Principal–Agent Theories 
Because the Supreme Court and lower federal courts are not in a direct 
contractual relationship and because they are presumed to pursue policy 
goals rather than wealth-maximization, principal–agent theories do not pre-
cisely fit the circumstances of the federal judicial hierarchy.  Of course, the 
purpose of using models is to simplify reality, and no model will fully cap-
ture the complexity of actual institutions.  The usefulness of a model thus 
depends not on the precise degree of fit with actual circumstances but on 
whether it advances or impedes our understanding.  In many ways, princip-
al–agent theories have pushed forward our understanding of judicial deci-
sionmaking.  Attitudinal models tended to focus solely on the preferences 
of the individual judge.  The application of principal–agent theories led to 
greater attention to institutional context and emphasized the importance of 
interactions between courts in shaping judicial behavior. 
Utilizing a principal–agent framework, scholars have produced impor-
tant insights about such issues as the role of litigants in influencing moni-
toring by the Supreme Court,123 the Court’s strategies for selecting cases for 
review,124 and how interactions with lower courts might shape the Court’s 
choice of doctrine.125  As I argue below, however, relying on a principal–
agent model also has some costs because it obscures important normative 
questions as well as some significant descriptive features of the judicial hie-
rarchy. 
1. Normative Questions.—Much of the scholarship on the judicial 
hierarchy is imbued with an implicit normative cast.  Scholars write about 
lower court judges “shirking,”126 “sabotag[ing],”127 “running amok,”128 or, on 




122  Moe raises an analogous question by asking what it means for Congress to control the bureau-
cracy and arguing that theories of congressional dominance are quite vague about whether control means 
that agency actions reflect the goals of Congress as a whole, those of the relevant legislative committees, 
or those of key individual members of Congress.  See Moe, supra note 64, at 482–83. 
123  See Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 688–90.  
124  See Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1; Spitzer & Talley, supra note 1.  
125  See Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 5; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1; McNollgast, 
supra note 3.  
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superiors.  These studies of lower court behavior purport to be asking posi-
tive questions about how circuit and district court judges decide cases.  
Nevertheless, the language used to frame them reveals the normative as-
sumption that often underlies them—namely that lower court judges should 
pursue the Supreme Court’s interests rather than their own or some other in-
terests.  This assumption follows naturally from the application of princip-
al–agent theories, in which agents have a duty to act on behalf of the 
principal, but it is never explicitly justified in the context of the judiciary. 
Under the common law of agency, the source of the duty is clear—the 
agent is obligated to advance the principal’s interests because of the con-
tractual agreement between them.  The contract not only empowers the 
agent to act on the principal’s behalf, it also binds her to do so as a fidu-
ciary.  Similarly, economic theories of agency assume that the principal has 
a right to expect the agent to act on its behalf based on the contractual rela-
tionship between them.  To return to the earlier cited examples, the em-
ployee, the manager, and the tenant farmer, having agreed to the agency 
relationship, should not act in a way that is harmful to the principal’s inter-
est.  The main difference between the legal and economic approaches is that 
the former relies on a legally enforceable standard of behavior, while the 
latter emphasizes the structure of the contractual relationship itself to pro-
mote compliance with this expectation. 
When applied to the public bureaucracy, the principal–agent model si-
milarly places normative demands on the agent’s behavior.  The extensive 
bureaucracy, whose officials are unelected, poses a threat to representative 
democracy unless the actions of the bureaucratic officials are controlled by 
elected officials.  Thus, scholars have debated whether members of Con-
gress or the President in fact control the agencies, thereby making them res-
ponsive to the needs of the electorate.130  Much of this literature assumes 
that bureaucrats should pursue the policy goals of Congress and that greater 
political control of the bureaucracy is desirable.  Several scholars, however, 
have questioned this underlying normative premise.  David Spence, for ex-
ample, argues that “the assumption that more political control is better is at 
least debatable,”131 while Brian Cook asks whether the status of public bu-
reaucracies “as agents of popularly elected executives and legislatures 
[should be] the subject of debate rather than the accepted point of departure 
for theory building.”132  Others have questioned whether agencies should be 
                                                                                                                 
126  See, e.g., Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 693. 
127  Benesh & Reddick, supra note 1, at 536.  
128  Randazzo, supra note 1, at 685. 
129  Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 690. 
130  See supra Part II.C.  
131  Spence, supra note 87, at 215.  Spence raises the question of whether political control may in 
fact facilitate agency capture.  See id. at 215–16. 
132  Brian J. Cook & B. Dan Wood, Debate, Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureau-
cracy, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 965, 970 (1989). 
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controlled by current political leaders133 or instead should be responsive to 
prior officials—that is, “all of those static coalitions from the past that suc-
cessfully had their policy ambitions transformed into law.”134  Thus, a nor-
mative ambiguity underlies the classic Congress–bureaucracy literature: 
whom should we view as the true principal of the bureaucratic agency?  Put 
differently, to whom does the bureaucratic agent owe a duty of loyalty—
current key members of Congress or the enacting political coalition that 
created and empowered the agency? 
The common assumption that the lower federal courts are agents with a 
duty to act on behalf of the Supreme Court masks a similar normative ques-
tion: why should lower federal court judges pursue the interests of the Su-
preme Court and not their own goals or some other interest?  Perhaps 
federal judges are better understood as agents (in the normative sense) of 
Congress, particularly when they are interpreting statutes, or of the Presi-
dent who nominated them.135  Or perhaps the principal, whose interest they 
should seek to advance, is the public or, more provocatively, the law.136  For 
each of these hypothetical principals, serious questions exist regarding the 
extent to which it could or does control the actions of federal district and 
circuit court judges.  However, the normative possibilities that lower court 
judges should pursue these interests deserve consideration.   
Positing that the Supreme Court is the appropriate principal, what rea-
sons exist for requiring lower courts to pursue its preferences?  Common 
law agency doctrine and economic theories suggest that the obligation to 
pursue the principal’s interests stems from the agent’s consent to the agency 
relationship.  As discussed above, however, there is no direct contractual re-
lationship between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, elimi-
nating the usual basis for holding the agent to a fiduciary duty to act on 
behalf of the principal.  For the public bureaucracy, political control is justi-
fied by the need for representational legitimacy—that is, agency activity 
should be controlled by Congress because the latter is more directly respon-
sive to the needs and wishes of the public.  This argument, however, is in-
sufficient to support a normative claim that lower court judges should 




133  See, e.g., Weingast & Moran, supra note 61, at 768. 
134  See B. Dan Wood, Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements, 
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 231 (1988).  On this view, agencies are “agents of the law who, by virtue of 
delegated authority, are transformed into quasi principals.”  Id.  
135  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
136  Federal judges must swear their allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of the United States 
upon taking office:  
I, __________ __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully 
and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as __________ under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.  So help me God.   
28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006).   
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court judges should be responsive to the public in their decisionmaking,137 
requiring them to pursue the preferences of the Supreme Court, which is al-
so staffed by unelected judges, will not solve the need for representational 
legitimacy.  Although Supreme Court Justices are subject to greater scrutiny 
during the appointment process than lower court judges, they will not nec-
essarily be better representatives of public views, particularly over time.  
Supreme Court nominees have become increasingly opaque in their res-
ponses during the confirmation process, making it difficult to know their 
preferences.138  Once appointed, life tenure largely insulates the Justices 
from the influence of shifting democratic majorities.139  If anything, Su-
preme Court Justices may be even less broadly representative in their back-
grounds and less responsive to the public than circuit judges and especially 
district judges, who are both more numerous and more deeply embedded in 
particular legal communities. 
What then is the basis for the common assumption that lower federal 
court judges should pursue the goals of the Supreme Court?  Undoubtedly it 
relates to the principle of vertical stare decisis—the legal rule that courts 
should follow the precedent of courts with revisory authority over them.140  
Judicial politics scholars who have relied on principal–agent theories, how-
ever, have sometimes confused the legal norm—obey the precedent of the 
superior court—with a quite different normative mandate—pursue the pre-
ferences of the superior court.  Of course lower courts must follow the pre-
ferences of the Supreme Court to the extent that they are embodied in 
legally binding precedents, but many judicial politics scholars have sug-
gested that their duty extends further—to pursuing the interests and prefe-
rences of the Court even when not fully expressed in doctrine.  For 
example, Songer, Segal, and Cameron argue that “[i]f the circuit courts con-
sisted of faithful agents, they would obediently follow the policy dictates 
set down by the Supreme Court . . . [rather than] their own policy prefe-
rences.”141  Tracey George and Albert Yoon similarly raise as a concern 
“the possibility . . . that judges will not comply with Supreme Court prefe-




137  One might just as forcefully argue that the role of the federal courts as a whole is to act as a 
countermajoritarian institution.  See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 19, 45 (1969) (arguing that the most important function of the Supreme Court is anti-
majoritarian in that it is intended to protect minorities against oppression by majorities).  
138  See, e.g., Richard Brust, No More Kabuki Confirmations, ABA J., Oct. 2009, at 38. 
139  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
140  See Caminker, supra note 89, at 823–25 (explaining and justifying the doctrine of hierarchical 
precedent). 
141  Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 675. 
142  George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 819; see also Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 328 (describing 
“policy errors” as policy outcomes disfavored by the higher court); Lindquist, Haire & Songer, supra 
note 1, at 608 (“[C]ircuit court compliance with Supreme Court justices’ preferences for particular out-
comes is far from assured . . . .”); cf. Clark, supra note 1, at 60 (explaining how an appellate panel, the 
agent of the circuit, may “follow its own preferences and disregard the Circuit’s” preferences). 
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the claim that the lower courts should pursue the interests of the Supreme 
Court appears uncontroversial. 
Scholars who make this assumption find evidence of “shirking” when 
the relative proportion of liberal and conservative outcomes in the lower 
courts does not mirror Supreme Court outcomes.143  As I have argued else-
where, however, lower courts might reach divergent outcomes while still 
complying with legal norms.144  Precedent—legal doctrine—inevitably af-
fords discretion to lower courts in deciding cases, not only because of the 
indeterminacy of language but also because of choices the Supreme Court 
makes in framing its decisions.145  For example, if the Court chooses to is-
sue a narrow rather than broad opinion, or opts for an open-ended standard 
rather than a rigid rule, it will create discretionary spaces that afford lower 
courts considerable leeway in deciding subsequent cases.  And where legal 
discretion exists, the exercise of judgment is permissible.  The lower courts 
are under no legal duty to follow Supreme Court preferences that have not 
been articulated in the form of binding precedent.146  Recall the example of 
the Garcetti case.  If a circuit court finds that a public employee’s speech 
was not made pursuant to her official duties and permits her First Amend-
ment claim to proceed, it has followed the Garcetti decision, even though 
the Supreme Court might have reached a different conclusion had it consi-
dered the same case.  In short, a duty to follow precedent does not justify an 
insistence that lower court judges pursue Supreme Court preferences re-
garding outcomes. 
So far then the assumption that lower courts should pursue the interests 
of the Supreme Court appears to lack justification.  No explicit contract or 
legal norm requires it, and concerns about democratic legitimacy cannot 
explain it.  Such a duty, however, might be explained on functional 
grounds.  The rule of vertical stare decisis is sometimes justified on grounds 
of efficiency and uniformity.147  According to this argument, lower courts 
should follow Supreme Court precedent, even when they disagree with it, 
because to do otherwise would waste judicial resources, delay resolution, 
and result in inconsistent outcomes.  A rule of vertical stare decisis ad-
vances the goals of efficiency and uniformity by expanding the power of the 




143  See, e.g., Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 1, at 692–93 (interpreting divergent patterns of 
decisions by liberal and conservative appellate judges as evidence that they sometimes “shirk” by ad-
vancing their own policy preferences rather than those of the Supreme Court). 
144  See Kim, supra note 8, at 410–12.  
145  See id. at 414–15.  Jacobi and Tiller have explored more formally the conditions under which 
appellate courts might choose one type of doctrine, or “legal instrument,” rather than another.  See Jaco-
bi & Tiller, supra note 1. 
146  Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court 
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 n.20 (1994) (citing sources stating that lower courts should decide 
cases based on existing precedents, not by predicting how higher courts are likely to decide the issue).  
147  See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 89, at 839–56 (explaining consequentialist justifications for the 
doctrine of hierarchical precedent).   
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over the best rule to follow.  It does not necessarily follow, however, that 
the interests of efficiency and uniformity demand that lower court judges 
also advance Supreme Court preferences, not just follow its precedents.148  I 
have argued elsewhere that these consequentialist arguments do not support 
expanding the duties of the lower courts in this way, and the main effect of 
doing so would be to unduly concentrate power in the hands of the Justic-
es.149 
The latter point is best illustrated by considering the extreme case.  If 
the actions of the lower courts were easily observable and the Supreme 
Court had infinite resources to monitor and correct their decisions, its agen-
cy problem would be solved, enabling it to exercise complete control over 
the output of the hundreds of circuit and district judges who decide the 
overwhelming mass of federal cases.  In traditional principal–agent rela-
tionships, such a situation would generally be viewed as desirable.  For ex-
ample, it would be seen as a good thing if managers faithfully pursued the 
interests of shareholders without engaging in self-dealing, or if the tenant 
farmer invested a level of effort that maximized crop yield rather than opt-
ing for more leisure.  But is it normatively attractive to imagine that the Su-
preme Court could ensure that all lower federal court judges precisely 
followed its will?  Would it be a good thing if such enormous power were 
concentrated in the hands of nine unelected individuals? 
If the Supreme Court itself were more directly responsive to governing 




148  Evan H. Caminker makes a normative argument that, at least in some circumstances, lower 
courts should decide cases according to their prediction of how superior courts would decide them.  See 
Caminker, supra note 146, at 35–66.  More specifically, Caminker argues that lower court judges should 
try to predict future Supreme Court decisions in cases in which “highly probative predictive data are 
available—that is, when fragmented dispositional rules or well-considered dicta clearly foreshadow the 
Supreme Court’s future direction.”  Id. at 73.  These circumstances are “admittedly narrow,” id. at 1, and 
even if persuasive, Caminker’s arguments do not necessarily support a generalized duty to follow supe-
rior court preferences.  
149  See Kim, supra note 8, at 436–40. 
150  Barry Friedman argues that, throughout American history, the Supreme Court has been influ-
enced by the views of the public because those views can motivate political leaders to follow the Court 
or to discipline it.  BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 375 (2009) (“The Court has to be at-
tuned to aroused public opinion because it is the public that can save a Court in trouble with political 
leaders and likewise can motivate political leaders against it.”); see also id. at 370–71 (asserting that 
“[t]he people and their elected representatives have had the ability . . . to assert pressure” on the Justic-
es).  While this is undoubtedly true to some degree, the question remains as to how responsive the Court 
actually is to public opinion.  Compare, e.g., id. at 375 (claiming that the Supreme Court Justices may be 
influenced by public opinion because “they care about preserving the Court’s institutional pow-
er . . . [and] about not being disciplined by politics”), and POSNER, supra note 7, at 375 (asserting that 
Supreme Court Justices are reined in by awareness “that they cannot go ‘too far’ without inviting repris-
als by the other branches of government spurred on by an indignant public”), with JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424–28 (2002) 
(arguing that there is no evidence that public opinion directly influences the Supreme Court), and Law-
rence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 
GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010) (asserting that the Supreme Court is responsive to elites, not public opinion).  Ri-
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currently, the levers that public officials wield over the Supreme Court are 
quite weak.  The combination of life tenure, no mandatory retirement age, 
and increased longevity means that turnover on the Court has become in-
creasingly infrequent.151  Thus, the opportunities for elected officials to alter 
the composition of the United States Supreme Court are “fitful and irregu-
lar,”152 and the chance to change its ideological balance is rarer still.153  
Thus, scholars have noted the risk that “the Court will embody a lagging 
average of electoral politics and attempt to impose upon today’s governing 
coalition the views of yesterday’s governing coalition.”154  Of course the po-
litical branches have a variety of tools, such as court-packing and jurisdic-
tion-stripping, to try to influence the decisions of the Court,155 but the 
effectiveness of these tools in actually constraining the Justices has been a 
matter of debate.156  Given that political control is necessarily limited, some 
diffusion of power to the lower courts may be a useful antidote to the risk of 
excessive Supreme Court power, particularly if it turns out that the compo-
sition of the lower courts is more fluid and therefore more responsive to 
shifting political coalitions.   
A good deal more analytical and empirical work is required to deter-
mine the optimal balance between centralization and diffusion of judicial 
                                                                                                                 
chard Pildes not only questions the descriptive claim that political majorities constrain the Supreme 
Court but also challenges whether the “majoritarian thesis” can answer moral questions about the legiti-
macy of judicial review or assure that the Court’s judicial review power will be appropriately limited in 
the future.  Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 
103.  Of course, the extent to which the Supreme Court should be responsive to public opinion is also a 
matter of controversy.  See FRIEDMAN, supra, at 372–74 (worrying that Justices follow public opinion 
too closely and thus fail to fulfill “the traditional role of judicial review in protecting minority rights”).  
That latter debate, however, addresses the proper roles of the different branches of government, while 
my focus here is on the relationship—and the allocation of power—between the Supreme Court and the 
lower federal courts.   
151  See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Re-
considered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 777–89 (2006); see also Pildes, supra note 150, at 139–41 
(arguing that the appointments process is a much weaker mechanism for political control over the Su-
preme Court than it was in the past). 
152  David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
1545, 1589 (2009). 
153  See Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 231, 238–39 (2007). 
154  See Law, supra note 152, at 1589 & n.266. 
155  See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Insti-
tutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 981–94 (2002) (reviewing tools available to po-
litical branches to try to control the judiciary as a whole, such as the appointment power and Congress’s 
ability to control the judiciary’s budget and to limit its subject matter jurisdiction).   
156  Compare, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 150, at 375 (asserting that the Court has responded to at-
tempts by the political branches to discipline it through actions such as court-packing and jurisdiction-
stripping), with SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 150, at 424–25 (arguing that “if Congress has virtually no 
direct influence on the Court, it is hardly likely that the influence of public opinion will flow indirectly 
through Congress”), and Pildes, supra note 150, at 133–39 (questioning the effectiveness of the tools 
available to Congress to curb the Supreme Court). 
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power.157  The point here is that questions of institutional design require that 
we first explicate our normative goals—for example, whose interests should 
district and circuit courts serve?—and then ask how various structures and 
norms affect those goals.  The widespread reliance on principal–agent theo-
ries to describe the judicial hierarchy has obscured these normative ques-
tions such that they have largely gone unasked. 
2. Descriptive Features.—The reliance on principal–agent theories 
has not only obscured important normative questions but also distorted our 
understanding of certain descriptive features of the judicial hierarchy as 
well.  In particular, the principal–agent perspective and its focus on hierar-
chical control have reinforced a Supreme Court-centric view of the courts.  
Susan Haire, Stefanie Lindquist, and Donald Songer write that “the federal 
judicial hierarchy is designed to enable the Supreme Court, sitting at the 
system’s apex, to impose its collective will on lower federal judges.”158  Al-
though they go on to acknowledge that “the Court’s control is far from ab-
solute,”159 it would be far more accurate to describe the federal judicial 
hierarchy as a system designed to limit the Supreme Court’s ability to im-
pose its collective will on lower courts.   
If in fact the goal were to centralize power and strengthen discipline 
over lower court judges, then the judicial branch would be structured quite 
differently.  For example, it might be designed much like the Japanese judi-
ciary, whose ranks are composed of career judges who have been screened, 
selected, and trained by a bureaucracy under the control of the Chief Justice 
of the Japanese Supreme Court and an elite cadre of judges in the Secreta-
riat.160  This administrative bureaucracy exercises power not only over low-
er court judges’ pay but over their assignments as well, thereby controlling 
what type of cases they will hear, where they will live, and ultimately the 
trajectories of their entire careers.161  These powers are wielded effectively 
to discourage rulings out of line with the prevailing ideology.162  Alterna-
tively, centralized control might be strengthened by holding judges perso-




157  For example, as Judith Resnik has observed, procedural rules of review entail choices to diffuse 
or concentrate power among different types of judges or decisionmakers.  See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 850–51, 868–89 (1984).  The reverse is also true: value choices regarding the 
allocation of judicial power do and should inform decisions about institutional design, including rules of 
procedure. 
158  Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 1, at 143–44. 
159  Id. at 144. 
160  See Law, supra note 152, at 1549–64. 
161  Id. at 1556–58. 
162  See id. at 1560–62 (describing the ability of the central bureaucracy to reward and sanction 
judges for their decisions and explaining that “Japanese judges march out of ideological sync with the 
bureaucracy at their own peril”). 
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reversed on appeal, as occurs in China’s local courts.163  In comparison to 
these robust tools for controlling subordinate judges in other judicial sys-
tems, the United States Supreme Court’s ability to control the lower federal 
courts by reversing a tiny fraction of their decisions appears quite feeble. 
Not only does the Supreme Court lack the tools to directly sanction 
lower court judges, but legal norms further limit its supervisory powers as 
well.  For example, the general rule against permitting new evidence to be 
considered at the appellate level164 and the standard of review requiring ap-
pellate courts to defer to a trial court’s factual findings165 exacerbate the 
lower courts’ informational advantage.  Even the Supreme Court’s reversal 
power cannot be exercised unless the losing party petitions for certiorari.  In 
a system designed to maximize Supreme Court control, one might expect to 
see rules that permit appellate courts to receive additional evidence, do not 
require deference to the findings of trial courts, and allow the Justices to se-
lect any decision for review.  That these features are not part of the federal 
appellate system suggests that the institutional structure is designed to 
achieve goals other than enhancing Supreme Court control.  Thus, unlike 
economic theories of agency, in which the need to control agency costs 
helps explain the structure of the firm,166 a focus on agency costs cannot ex-
plain the existing institutional structure of the federal judiciary. 
In addition, principal–agent theories tend to entrench a particular view 
of the role of law in the judicial hierarchy.  The common assumption of 
these theories is that judges are primarily motivated by policy—that is, their 
goal in deciding cases is to enact their policy preferences into law.  In earli-
er work, this assumption led judicial politics scholars to dismiss law and 
doctrine as mere rhetoric or window-dressing, a cover for judges’ true in-
tentions.167  Thus, the study of court decisions at all levels of the judiciary 
focused on judicial votes—typically examining the political valence of case 




163  See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in 
China, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 53, 72–74 (2009) (describing “responsibility systems” applied to Chinese 
courts). 
164  See, e.g., Tonry v. Sec. Experts, Inc., 20 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining the “basic te-
net of appellate jurisprudence . . . that parties may not unilaterally supplement the record on appeal with 
evidence not reviewed by the court below”); 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
EDWARD H. COOPER & CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3956.1 (4th ed. 
2008) (noting that generally courts of appeals will not consider matter that is not part of the record 
transmitted by the trial court).  
165  See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (“[R]eview of factual 
findings under the clearly-erroneous standard—with its deference to the trier of fact—is the rule, not the 
exception.”). 
166  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 39, at 357. 
167  See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15, at 34 (arguing that “the legal model serves only to ratio-
nalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality” that Justices decide cases based on their personal 
policy preferences); id. at 363 (asserting that the legal model “masks the reality of choice based on the 
individual justices’ personal policy preferences”).  
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proach has been much criticized for failing to take seriously the law and le-
gal institutions.168 
More recently, judicial politics scholars have begun to focus their at-
tention on the role that legal doctrine plays in the interaction between upper 
and lower courts.  Once again, the starting point is the assumption that 
judges are primarily motivated by their policy goals; however, rather than 
dismissing law as irrelevant, these scholars theorize that the law plays an 
important role in communication between different levels of courts.  Draw-
ing on traditional principal–agent theories, legal doctrine is conceived as the 
form in which the Supreme Court as principal gives direction to its 
agents.169  Due to legitimacy concerns, the Court is constrained in how it 
communicates its preferences.  It cannot simply instruct the lower courts to 
pursue certain policy outcomes but must instead direct its agents through 
written opinions that cite precedent and reason from accepted legal premis-
es.170  On this view, the law is the means by which the Supreme Court tells 
lower court judges how they should decide cases. 
Scholars utilizing principal–agent theories have generally taken one of 
two approaches to the question of how doctrine influences lower court 
judges.  Some assume that the law merely operates as a signal.  The law 
does not bind lower court judges in any meaningful way.  Rather, they pay 
attention to Supreme Court doctrine because it informs them of what types 
of outcomes are likely to provoke a sanction—reversal—and how they can 
safely avoid negative scrutiny.  For example, McNollgast assumes that 
judicial doctrine “consists of a statement about the range of lower court de-
cisions acceptable to the Court.”171  To the extent that a lower court is ob-
served to follow upper court precedent, it is “not because it considers the 
higher court decision authoritative (and hence creating an obligation) or 
persuasive but because of the threat of reversal and a worse outcome from 
its own perspective.”172  Apart from its signaling function, the law has no 




168  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006) 
(“[R]eflecting an almost pathological skepticism that law matters, positive scholars of courts and judicial 
behavior simply fail to take law and legal institutions seriously.”); see also Howard Gillman, What’s 
Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 
26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001) (describing criticisms of positive political theorists, or “judicial be-
havioralists,” for failing to take legal variables into account).  
169  See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 5, at 757; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, 
at 328; McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1641. 
170  See Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 331 (“Writing doctrines that specify particular policy out-
comes in place of reasoned and consistent application of neutral rules and principles would ultimately 
weaken the legitimacy of judicial power.”). 
171  McNollgast, supra note 3, at 1641. 
172  Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent 
in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1611 (1995) (describing lower courts’ motivation in 
agency models). 
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Others assume that legal doctrine has some operative force—that is, 
lower court judges feel obligated to obey Supreme Court doctrine and will 
do so, even when they do not agree with it.173  This approach is agnostic 
about the reasons these judges follow doctrine.  It may be because they have 
been socialized to respect superior court precedent, because doctrine pro-
vides a useful decision heuristic, or for some other reason.  Whatever the 
explanation, it assumes that “lower court judges display legal obedience,”174 
such that the Court can use “the language of its decisions and the structure 
of doctrine to limit options of lower courts.”175  And because they feel 
bound by doctrine, the law can be used as an “instrument of political con-
trol by higher courts over lower courts and the case outcomes they pro-
duce.”176   
Despite their differing accounts of the effect of doctrine on lower court 
judges, both of these approaches share the assumption that lower court 
judges will pursue their own policy preferences to the extent feasible, given 
the constraints imposed by either the reversal threat or the normative force 
of legal doctrine.  Just like the economic agent who shirks whenever the 
principal is not watching, lower court judges are depicted as strategic actors 
who will pursue their own goals to the extent that they can and who there-
fore seek to evade scrutiny of their actions.177  Even when the law is as-
sumed to have some normative force, agency theory suggests that lower 
courts view it as a stricture to be evaded whenever their preferences differ 
from those of the Supreme Court. 
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING LAW AND THE JUDICIAL HIERARCHY 
I have argued above that despite their widespread acceptance, princip-
al–agent theories do not accurately capture the structure of the relationships 
within the judiciary.  While these models have been useful in advancing 
understanding of Supreme Court–lower court interactions, they are not nec-
essarily the best or only way of analyzing hierarchical relationships.  In the 
absence of the usual contractual tools for shaping the relationship, the Su-
preme Court’s agency problem begins to look much like the problem con-
fronting any strategic actor when interacting with other parties whose 
actions can affect outcomes and thus its ultimate payoff.  Moreover, there 
are costs to relying on these theories because models necessarily focus at-




173  See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita & Stephenson, supra note 5, at 757; George & Yoon, supra note 1, 
at 824; Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 327. 
174  Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 330. 
175  George & Yoon, supra note 1, at 823–24. 
176  Jacobi & Tiller, supra note 1, at 326. 
177  Cf. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN 
JUDGING 119 (2010) (criticizing the strategic model of judging as “paint[ing] an implausible picture of 
judges as magnificent Machiavellian calculators pursuing political agendas with hardly any legal integri-
ty”). 
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lens has obscured important normative questions and distorted significant 
descriptive features of the federal judicial hierarchy.  
Discarding the language of principal–agent theory expands the possi-
bilities for describing the interactions between upper and lower courts.  
Agency theories tend to caricature the strategies of both the Supreme Court 
and the lower federal courts.  In these accounts, the Supreme Court is singu-
larly focused on controlling the decisional output of the lower courts to en-
sure that lower court decisions comport with its preferences, while the 
lower courts are principally concerned with evasion in order to achieve their 
own policy goals.  Law and doctrine are merely tools in this struggle—ways 
of signaling or commanding obedience on the one hand and of feigning 
compliance and avoiding detection on the other.  What is entirely missing 
from this account is any sense that courts at the various levels of the hie-
rarchy might be engaged in a common venture—one in which cooperation 
offers the possibility of a joint payoff. 
Taking into account this possibility requires a shift in the basic as-
sumption that animates much of the judicial politics literature—namely, 
that judges are primarily motivated by their policy preferences.  Instead, 
one might view judges as engaged in an interaction that involves both ele-
ments of cooperation and conflict in a type of mixed-motive coordination 
game.178  From this perspective, judges share a common goal—the produc-
tion of a (relatively) coherent body of rules that can govern primary beha-
vior in the real world and is viewed as authoritative.  At the same time, their 
efforts at cooperation are plagued by conflicts over what substantive rules 
or policies should be instantiated in the law.  They struggle over what legal 
policies to pursue, but if taken too far, this conflict will undermine coordi-
nation to the point that the coherence of the system unravels, leaving all 
worse off. 
Notice that this approach reverses the usual understanding among judi-
cial politics scholars of the relationship between law and politics.  Under 
the agency model, judges are assumed to pursue their policy preferences, 
and they use the law as a means for doing so.  Law expresses their preexist-
ing policy preferences and is an instrument for exercising control over poli-
cy outcomes.  By contrast, in this alternative framework the production of 




178  As an alternative to the agency model of adjudication, Lewis Kornhauser has proposed a “team 
model,” which he argues explains the institutional structure of the United States courts—that is, a sys-
tem with trials and appellate courts arranged hierarchically, strict vertical precedent, and horizontal 
precedent binding only at the appellate level.  See Kornhauser, supra note 172, at 1628.  While his pro-
posed model usefully highlights the cooperative aspects of judicial decisionmaking, it does so by assum-
ing that judges at all levels seek to maximize the number of correct decisions and that they share a 
common understanding of what the “correct” answers are.  See id. at 1612–13.  Unfortunately, the mod-
el’s failure to take into account value conflicts within the judiciary limits its usefulness in understanding 
and predicting judicial behavior. 
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uct of judicial efforts at all levels of the hierarchy, but it is also inevitably 
the ground for contestation over policy choices. 
Law in this sense refers not to a specific case outcome, or even a par-
ticular doctrine, but to a body of rules that together govern social interac-
tions.  In order to be efficacious, this body of rules must have certain 
characteristics.  For example, it must be reasonably coherent and sufficient-
ly determinate to allow predictions as to its application but also flexible 
enough to adapt to changing social conditions.  I do not attempt to enume-
rate or justify the necessary characteristics here.  What is important is that 
judicially created law must have certain attributes in order to play its func-
tional role in regulating social interactions and to be viewed as legitimate.  
And courts at different levels of the judicial hierarchy must coordinate their 
actions in order to develop a body of rules displaying these attributes.  
Thus, written opinions are better understood not as window-dressing mask-
ing policy decisions, or even as signals commanding obedience, but as cru-
cial tools in coordinating the judicial function of rule creation and 
development.  
In their study of the Supreme Court’s certiorari decisions, Charles Ca-
meron, Jeffrey Segal, and Donald Songer acknowledge that their approach 
focused on the Court’s “enforc[ement] [of its] doctrinal prefe-
rences . . . throughout the judicial hierarchy but ignore[d] . . . the evolutio-
nary creation of doctrine.”179  Emphasizing the latter—“the incremental, 
fact-soaked creation of new rules”180—suggests that controlling lower court 
outcomes is less important than finding appropriate cases for identifying 
areas in need of development and for articulating rules to address them.  
Not only must the Supreme Court rely on the lower courts to provide these 
vehicles for law development, but it also must procure their cooperation in 
applying its precedents to create a coherent body of rules.  Because of its 
limited capacity and the infinite variety of factual situations that may arise 
in the future, the Court necessarily creates incomplete doctrines.  These im-
precise rules are subsequently elucidated by the lower courts through their 
application to a broad variety of concrete situations.  Thus, the meaning of a 
particular doctrine cannot be fixed in advance by the Supreme Court but 
will necessarily evolve through the process of implementation by lower 
courts. 
This depiction of law is in many ways like descriptions of the devel-
opment of the common law but with a focus on interactions between courts 
within a hierarchy rather than over time.  Intractable value conflicts are ul-
timately resolved by reference to hierarchical authority, but such resolutions 
can never be completely final.  Thus, if the Supreme Court disagrees with a 




179  Cameron, Segal & Songer, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
180  Id. at 102. 
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culate its own rule.  That rule, however, will in turn be subject to interpreta-
tion by the lower courts in subsequent cases.   
In struggling over policy, different levels of the judiciary could try to 
erode the power of the other.  For example, the Supreme Court might im-
pose increasingly rigid rules in an effort to limit the discretion of lower 
court judges, while lower courts might attempt to undermine Supreme 
Court authority by increasingly distinguishing and limiting its precedent.  
Taken to an extreme, coordination between the courts could break down, 
destroying the coherence of legal doctrine and the legitimacy of the system 
as a whole.181  Thus, although each level of the judiciary has incentives to 
pursue its own interests, a complete failure of coordination risks an out-
come in which all are left worse off.  On the other hand, cooperation, even 
though it necessarily entails some suppression of individual policy prefe-
rences, may enhance overall coherence and legitimacy, thereby working to 
the mutual benefit of both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 
Viewing the Supreme Court and lower courts as players jointly en-
gaged in the production of law, whose interactions are characterized by both 
cooperation and conflict, leads to a different view of the function of infor-
mation.  As discussed above, principal–agent theories suggest that informa-
tional asymmetries allow agents to avoid scrutiny of their activities and 
thereby afford them greater discretion.  Agents therefore seek to exploit 
their informational advantage, while the principal will employ mechanisms 
to force information sharing.  If upper and lower court interactions are cha-
racterized by both cooperation and conflict, however, then the role of in-
formation becomes more complicated.  Lower courts may sometimes value 
transparency in their decisionmaking.  For example, publishing detailed 
written opinions aids upper courts by providing information about develop-
ing areas of law or new factual contexts.  At the same time, only by making 
their activities visible can lower court judges hope to influence policymak-
ing in these evolving areas of law.  Even when disagreeing with an upper 
court, a lower court may choose to visibly contest an established doctrine—
for example, by arguing that a related factual situation should be distin-
guished—in an attempt to shape policy by limiting its reach, rather than to 
“shirk” in the traditional sense by avoiding scrutiny.  The Supreme Court, 
on the other hand, may deliberately tolerate or encourage informational 




181  If the Supreme Court’s only lever of control is its reversal power, then it is theoretically possible 
that lower courts could “riot”—that is, engage in widespread disobedience of a Supreme Court 
precedent, knowing that the Court would not have the capacity to review all those decisions.  Such a 
reaction would be possible if enough lower courts disagreed strongly enough with a Supreme Court de-
cision and refused to enforce it.  In practice, rioting is unlikely because the preferences of lower courts 
are unlikely to diverge significantly enough from those of the Supreme Court and because lower courts 
may not be able to coordinate their actions effectively.  Nevertheless, massive disobedience by lower 
courts is theoretically possible.  The impact of such actions on the judiciary as a whole could be quite 
significant, destroying coherence and undermining institutional legitimacy.   
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ferentially182—in order to focus resources on law development rather than 
on controlling outcomes in particular cases. 
Elevating the role of law in this way does not entail formalist concep-
tions of law as a determinate body of rules or a “brooding omnipresence” 
waiting to be discovered through legal reason.  Nor does it endorse the 
more recent claim that judges merely act as umpires calling balls and 
strikes.  To the contrary, this view of the judicial hierarchy argues that 
judges are very much engaged in the project of making law.  But it argues 
that in doing so they are engaged in a cooperative venture.  No single court 
has the capacity or the expertise to develop a useful body of rules alone.  
All have an interest in cooperating in order to enhance the quality of their 
output and their collective legitimacy.  At the same time, articulating legal 
rules entails choices, and those choices often implicate policy concerns.  
The existence of varying policy preferences within the judiciary means that 
value conflicts are unavoidable, and the law is also a ground of contestation 
over policy.  Though inevitable, these policy conflicts are cabined to some 
extent by the need for cooperation.   
CONCLUSION 
The concept of agency has proven useful for analyzing a variety of re-
lationships in law, economics, and politics.  When applied to the federal 
judicial hierarchy, however, principal–agent theories fit poorly the characte-
ristics of the judiciary in a number of ways.  Although those theories useful-
ly highlight the possibility of value conflicts between the Supreme Court 
and lower courts, framing the relationship between them as one of agency 
has tended to obscure important normative questions about whose interests 
the lower courts should pursue and to paint a distorted picture of the role of 
law in judicial decisionmaking.  Given these limitations, alternative models 
may prove more fruitful in understanding the judicial hierarchy. 
The discussion above sketches out an alternative approach to concep-
tualizing the interactions within the judicial hierarchy and the role that law 
plays while avoiding the language and assumptions of agency theory.  This 
effort is preliminary, and more work remains to be done.  Nevertheless, the 
effort of developing new theoretical frameworks is important to advance 
understanding of relationships across the judicial hierarchy.  Crucial to this 
effort is the recognition that the Supreme Court and lower court judges are 
engaged in an ongoing interaction involving elements of both cooperation 
and conflict.  And rather than seeing the law as a mere tool in their struggle, 
it might be more productive to view the production of law as the joint goal 
of upper and lower courts as well as the grounds on which their value con-





182  See, e.g., supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 576 
 
